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Cited by 161Philosophical Ethics and TheoryFree Will and AgencyPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Luck and Moral Responsibility

Open access
Zimmerman, Michael J.·1987·Ethics
DOI 10.1086/292845
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Abstract

Considerable attention has recently been given to what has come to be called moral luck.It has been claimed that recognition of this phenomenon imperils the received conception of moral responsibility; some, indeed, have said that this conception must be revised in light of this recognition.The issue may be put in terms of a puzzle that revolves around the following argument: 1.A person P is morally responsible for an event e's occurring only if e's occurring was not a matter of luck.2. No event is such that its occurring is not a matter of luck.Therefore 3. No event is such that P is morally responsible for its occurring.The puzzle is supposed to reside in the fact that the premises seem true but the conclusion false.Reaction to the puzzle has been varied.Joel Feinberg, one of the first to pose the puzzle (though not exactly in these terms), seems prepared-at least provisionally-to accept the conclusion.' Thomas Nagel thinks that there is a genuine paradox here and seems prepared to accept both premises while denying the conclusion.2Bernard Williams, while arguing forcefully for the truth of the second premise, appears to deny the first, claiming that such denial runs counter to the received conception of moral responsibility.3Judith Andre likewise denies

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Zimmerman critically evaluates the moral-luck argument that luck undermines moral responsibility, presenting two versions and arguing neither is compelling. He concludes that the received conception of moral responsibility need not be revised, even though luck is ineliminable.

Key findings

  • The first version of the puzzle is easily dismissed: both premises are problematic; 1a may be false, and 2a is “plainly false.”
  • The second version is more interesting but unsound: even if 2b is true, 1b is “surely false,” so conclusion 3 is not forced.
  • Differential judgments based on situational and resultant luck may be unfair, but Zimmerman argues the unfairness lies in not ascribing responsibility to the noncollaborator, nonrescuer, or unsuccessful agent—not in blaming the actual agent.
  • He distinguishes “P is to blame for more events than P*” from “P is more to blame than P*,” and proposes principles 5 and 6 to neutralize resultant and situational luck, though these do not entail 1b.

Methods

  • Philosophical/critical paper: presents two versions of the moral-luck argument, criticizes the first in Section II, and discusses the second in Sections III–VII.
  • Uses conceptual analysis and thought experiments—Nazi collaborator/noncollaborator, rescuer/nonrescuer, two scientists, reckless drivers, Arnold/Arnold*, Sex Pistols—to test principles 4–6.
  • No empirical data or sample; the main analysis is argument evaluation and the proposal of principles 5 and 6.

Limitations

  • Stated: principles 5 and 6 are “still vague,” “too rough and problematic,” and the author does not argue for them here.
  • Stated: the counterfactual in principle 6 has “notoriously difficult” truth conditions and empirical verification is “very hard to come by”; the “ceteris paribus” clause is “not unproblematic” and is not filled in.
  • Stated: the precise nature and conditions of praise and blame cannot be spelled out here, and the rough picture of action is not defended.
  • Evident from text: no empirical data or sample; the argument relies on intuitions and counterfactual claims.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1086/292845

Cites

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 4 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Interpretationreasoning

    The received conception of moral responsibility is not in need of revision in light of moral luck.

    “nor is our received conception of moral responsibility in need of revision.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Interpretationnone given

    Differential judgment in the collaborator/noncollaborator case is unjustified.

    “because differential judgment in this case seems unjustified”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Principles 5 and 6, or something like them, are acceptable.
  • Interpretationnone given

    Premise 1a, that P is morally responsible for e's occurring only if P was in restricted control of e, is false when restricted control is understood as outlined.

    “There is reason to think that la is false, when”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Interpretationnone given

    The successful reckless driver is to blame for the pedestrian's death.

    “I have said that the successful driver is to blame for the pedestrian's death”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: A rough picture of action is presupposed: action consists in an agent's making a decision and this decision's causing a certain event, and free action is action in which the decision is free.
  • Interpretationreasoning

    Premise 2a is plainly false.

    “Second, 2a is plainly false”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 8
  • May combine two claims. 11

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingreasoning

    There are many things of which I am in restricted control right now, for example my thirst's being quenched.

    “For there are many things, it seems, of which I am in restricted control right now.For example: I now enjoy restricted control with respect to my thirst's being quenched”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The first version of the argument from luck against moral responsibility is easily dismissed, and both of its premises are problematic.

    “The first version of the argument is easily dismissed.Both premises are problematic.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    The proper conception of moral responsibility is not purely Kantian.

    “even though I agree that the proper conception appears not to be a purely Kantian one.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Our received conception of moral responsibility requires both that the role of luck be neutralized and that it nevertheless be possible for someone to be morally responsible for an event's occurring.

    “like Kant, I think that our received conception of moral responsibility requires both that the role of luck be neutralized and that it nevertheless be possible for someone to be morally responsible for an event's occurring.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kant

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    It is manifestly unfair to blame, and so also to praise, an object, even an agent, that lacks the capacity to act freely.

    “except to point out that it seems manifestly unfair to blame (and so, also, to praise) an object, even an agent, that lacks the capacity to act freely.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The proper conception of moral responsibility is not essentially Aristotelian, even though it is not purely Kantian.

    “And unlike Andre, I believe that this conception is not essentially Aristotelian, even though not purely Kantian.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andre

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The successful driver is to blame for more events than the unsuccessful one, but this does not imply that he is to be evaluated negatively to a greater extent than the unsuccessful driver.

    “The successful driver is to blame for more events than the unsuccessful one-more events serve to indicate that he is to be evaluated negatively on this occasion-but this does not imply that he is to be evaluated negatively to a greater extent than is the unsuccessful driver.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: A rough picture of action is presupposed: action consists in an agent's making a decision and this decision's causing a certain event, and free action is action in which the decision is free.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Principles 5 and 6, or something like them, are acceptable.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Premise 1b is false even if 2b is true.

    “But even if 2b is true, lb is surely false”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Hard determinism is false.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Judgments of praise and blame are not subject to moral justification, although as judgments they are subject to epistemic justification.

    “Not being actions, such judgments of praise and blame are not subject to moral justification (although, as judgments, they are subject to epistemic justification).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    Praise and blame are not actions but merely judgments about a person's moral standing or moral worth in light of the event in question.

    “such praise and blame are not actions but merely judgments, judgments about a person's moral standing or moral worth in light of the event in question.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The link between freedom and moral responsibility can be restored by altering clauses i and ii of principle 6 to read 'freely made' instead of just 'made' and by adding that P* had the capacity to act freely.

    “The link can be restored, albeit in different guise, simply by altering clauses i and ii of 6 so that they read”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: A rough picture of action is presupposed: action consists in an agent's making a decision and this decision's causing a certain event, and free action is action in which the decision is free.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Premise 2b is true; luck, whether situational or resultant, is an ineliminable part of existence.

    “Certainly, 2b seems true; in this sense, it must be admitted, luck (whether situational or resultant) is an ineliminable part of existence.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Active praising and blaming are subject to moral justification.

    “Active praising and blaming-actions which, typically, serve to express, and which thus presuppose, judgments of praise and blameare, of course, subject to moral justification”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Events after a free decision are strictly dispensable in the assessment of moral responsibility, though they may serve as indirect indicators of praise and blame.

    “Insofar as what happens after one has made a free decision is, in a sense, up to nature, then these events, while perhaps serving as indirect indicators of praise and blame, are strictly dispensable in the assessment of moral responsibility.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The world is unjust in the sense that an unfree object never has the opportunity to distinguish itself or disgrace itself so as to deserve praise or blame.

    “In this sense, the world is unjust.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The noncollaborator's being such that he would have made the decision to collaborate under the specified conditions was clearly not an action of his and might very well not have been a consequence of an action of his.

    “But the noncollaborator's being such that he would have made the decision to collaborate under the conditions specified was clearly not an action of his and might very well not have been a consequence of an action of his”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: A rough picture of action is presupposed: action consists in an agent's making a decision and this decision's causing a certain event, and free action is action in which the decision is free.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The difficulty with counterfactuals of the relevant form is due to either their having no truth value or empirical verification of them being very hard to come by.

    “This difficulty is due to one of two things: either such counterfactuals have no truth value, or empirical verification of them is very hard to come by.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
17 of 17

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Hard determinism is false.

    “Unless hard determinism is true-and I am assuming that it is not.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    A rough picture of action is presupposed: action consists in an agent's making a decision and this decision's causing a certain event, and free action is action in which the decision is free.

    “The picture is this: action consists in an agent's making a decision and this decision's causing a certain event.Free action is simply action in which the decision is free.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Principles 5 and 6, or something like them, are acceptable.

    “I do not wish to argue for them here, although I do advocate acceptance of them (or of something like them).”
3 of 3

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Drunk drivers are judged differently depending on the harm they cause, even when they expose others to the same risk.

    “Drunk drivers are judged differently, depending on the harm they cause as a result of exposing others to risk (Hartman, 2017(Hartman, , 2018;;Zimmerman, 1987).”

    From Moral Luck (2026) · cites this paper as Zimmerman, 1987

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Zimmerman, M. J.
Corresponding author
Zimmerman, Michael J.
Venue
Ethics
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
1987-01
Volume
97
Issue
2
Pages
374-386
ISSN
  • 0014-1704 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-297X
DOI
10.1086/292845
OpenAlex
W1976613925
Semantic Scholar
1e0e4edc08553f8bb96e0aae5821213959653874
Cited by
161
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 6
FWCI
3.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Ethics (publishedVersion)
  • NC Digital Online Collection of Knowledge and Scholarship (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro) (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Endowment for the Humanities
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
moral luck, moral responsibility, luck, Joel Feinberg, Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams

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