The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes
Abstract
Contests are situations in which an individual's reward depends on his performance relative to others. Students are graded on a curve; the candidate with the most votes gets the political office; the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position. Contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards, reducing monitoring costs, and minimizing risks from common uncertainties. They are employed to sort potential participants and, once they have entered, to induce appropriate effort from them. With monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables, optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants. The converse problems of climbing-low-ability individuals enter the contest designed for high-ability candidates-and slumming are shown to be manageable.
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Cites
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
Symonds, P. M. (1954) · Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0051901 · Cited by 4,875
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis.
Stoikov, J., Doeringer, P. B., & Piore, M. J. (1972) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521766 · Cited by 2,987
(2009) · Markets and Diversity · doi:10.2307/j.ctv1kz4h99.12 · Cited by 1,684
The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales
Akerlof, G. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885324 · Cited by 1,010
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Green, J. R., & Stokey, N. L. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261153 · Cited by 983
Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.7916/d87h1v6s · Cited by 975
Cited by
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
BAKER, G. P., JENSEN, M. C., & MURPHY, K. J. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.x · Cited by 1,702
A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms
Weyl, E. G. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1642 · Cited by 737
DECENTRALISATION AS AN INCENTIVE SCHEME
SALMON, P. (1987) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/3.2.24 · Cited by 515
Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study
Bull, C., Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K. (1987) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261439 · Cited by 493
Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?
O'Reilly, C. A., & Wade, J. (1993) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298309 · Cited by 474
Metadata
- Authors
- O'Keeffe, M., Viscusi, W. K., & Zeckhauser, R. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1984-01
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 27-56
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2020639423
- Cited by
- 391
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 7.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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