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Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle
Open accessAbstract
The simplest economic theories of crime predict that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies of minimal monitoring with large penalties for employee crime. We investigate possible reasons why firms actually spend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance. We find that the most plausible explanations for firms' large outlays on monitoring of employees-legal restrictions on penalty clauses in contracts and the adverse impact of harsh punishment schemes on worker morale-are also consistent with the payment of premium (rent-generating) wages by cost-minimizing firms.
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Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Cited by
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Glaeser, E. L., & Shleifer, A. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/.41.2.401 · Cited by 754
Corporate social responsibility as an employee governance tool: Evidence from a quasi‐experiment
Flammer, C., & Luo, J. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2492 · Cited by 547
Consumption Commitments and Risk Preferences
Chetty, R., & Szeidl, A. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.2.831 · Cited by 488
Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market
Layard, R., Nickell, S., & Jackman, R. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279166.001.0001 · Cited by 325
Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets
Pallais, A. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.11.3565 · Cited by 305
Metadata
- Authors
- Dickens, W. T., Katz, L. F., Lang, K., & Summers, L. H.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1989-07
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 331-347
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2130777179
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 15.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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