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Cited by 177

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle

Open access
Dickens, William T., Katz, Lawrence F., Lang, Kevin, Summers, Lawrence H.·1989·Journal of Labor Economics

Abstract

The simplest economic theories of crime predict that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies of minimal monitoring with large penalties for employee crime. We investigate possible reasons why firms actually spend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance. We find that the most plausible explanations for firms' large outlays on monitoring of employees-legal restrictions on penalty clauses in contracts and the adverse impact of harsh punishment schemes on worker morale-are also consistent with the payment of premium (rent-generating) wages by cost-minimizing firms.

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Metadata

Authors
Dickens, W. T., Katz, L. F., Lang, K., & Summers, L. H.
Venue
Journal of Labor Economics
Published
1989-07
Volume
7
Issue
3
Pages
331-347
ISSN
  • 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5307
OpenAlex
W2130777179
Cited by
177
References
1
FWCI
15.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/298211
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Dickens, W. T., Katz, L. F., Lang, K., & Summers, L. H. (1989). Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle. Journal of Labor Economics. https://doi.org/10.1086/298211

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