The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets
Abstract
Hiring inexperienced workers generates information about their abilities. If this information is public, workers obtain its benefits. If workers cannot compensate firms for hiring them, firms will hire too few inexperienced workers. I determine the effects of hiring workers and revealing more information about their abilities through a field experiment in an online marketplace. I hired 952 randomly-selected workers, giving them either detailed or coarse public evaluations. Both hiring workers and providing more detailed evaluations substantially improved workers' subsequent employment outcomes. Under plausible assumptions, the experiment's market-level benefits exceeded its cost, suggesting that some experimental workers had been inefficiently unemployed. (JEL J23, J24, M51)
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Cited by
Introduction—Platforms and Infrastructures in the Digital Age
Constantinides, P., Henfridsson, O., & Parker, G. G. (2018) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2018.0794 · Cited by 943
A first look at online reputation on Airbnb, where every stay is above average
Zervas, G., Proserpio, D., & Byers, J. W. (2021) · Marketing Letters · doi:10.1007/s11002-020-09546-4 · Cited by 600
Crépon, B., Duflo, E., Gurgand, M., Rathelot, R., & Zamora, P. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt001 · Cited by 558
Einav, L., Farronato, C., & Levin, J. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015334 · Cited by 553
Kuhn, K. M., & Maleki, A. (2017) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2015.0111 · Cited by 430
Metadata
- Authors
- Pallais, A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2014-11-01
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 3565-3599
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124347181
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 67.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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