The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Comparative Politics and Public Finance
Open accessAbstract
We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government.
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Citations
Cites
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261013 · Cited by 5,485
Cited by
The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1218 · Cited by 1,637
Self-citationThe Logic of Political Violence
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr025 · Cited by 450
Self-citationTransparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption
Azfar, O., & Nelson, W. R. (2007) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-006-9101-5 · Cited by 113
Metadata
- Authors
- Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2000-12
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1121-1161
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W3123458657
- Cited by
- 765
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 78.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
