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Cited by 261

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals

Brickley, James A., Van Horn, R. Lawrence·2002·The Journal of Law and Economics

Abstract

This paper examines the incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) in a large sample of nonprofit hospitals. The evidence indicates that both turnover and compensation of these CEOs are significantly related to financial performance (return on assets). We find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide explicit incentives for their CEOs to focus on altruistic activities. The turnover/performance relation appears stronger in nonprofit hospitals than in for‐profit hospitals and other for‐profit corporations (our data do not allow us to compare compensation incentives). Past research suggests that there is little distinction between the outputs and behaviors of private nonprofit and for‐profit hospitals. Consistent with these findings, our study suggests that managers face incentives to concentrate on financial performance in both types of organizations.

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Metadata

Authors
Brickley, J. A., & Van Horn, R. L.
Venue
The Journal of Law and Economics
Published
2002-04
Volume
45
Issue
1
Pages
227-249
ISSN
  • 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5285
OpenAlex
W2144857052
Cited by
261
References
26
FWCI
27.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/339493
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Brickley, J. A., & Van Horn, R. L. (2002). Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals. The Journal of Law and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1086/339493

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.