The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals
Abstract
This paper examines the incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) in a large sample of nonprofit hospitals. The evidence indicates that both turnover and compensation of these CEOs are significantly related to financial performance (return on assets). We find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide explicit incentives for their CEOs to focus on altruistic activities. The turnover/performance relation appears stronger in nonprofit hospitals than in for‐profit hospitals and other for‐profit corporations (our data do not allow us to compare compensation incentives). Past research suggests that there is little distinction between the outputs and behaviors of private nonprofit and for‐profit hospitals. Consistent with these findings, our study suggests that managers face incentives to concentrate on financial performance in both types of organizations.
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Cites
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
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Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
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Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
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Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467038 · Cited by 4,827
Outside directors and CEO turnover
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Industrial market structure and economic performance
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Corporate performance and managerial remuneration
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Cited by
Carey, K., & Dor, A. (2008) · Journal of Productivity Analysis · doi:10.1007/s11123-007-0065-3 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Brickley, J. A., & Van Horn, R. L.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-04
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 227-249
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W2144857052
- Cited by
- 261
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 27.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Brickley, J. A., & Van Horn, R. L. (2002). Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals. The Journal of Law and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1086/339493
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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