How Do Consumers Motivate Experts? Reputational Incentives in an Auto Repair Market
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Moral hazard exists in expert‐service markets because sellers have an incentive to shade their reports of the buyer's condition to increase the short‐run demand for their services. The California vehicle emission inspection market offers a rare opportunity to examine how reputational incentives work in such a market. I show that consumers are 30 percent more likely to return to a firm at which they previously passed than to one at which they previously failed and that demand is sensitive to a firm's failure rate across all consumers. These and other results suggest that demand incentives are strong in this market because consumers believe that firms differ greatly in their consumer friendliness and are skeptical even about those they choose. Weak demand incentives in other expert‐service markets are not a direct consequence of moral hazard, but rather of its interaction with switching costs and consumers' belief that firms are relatively homogeneous.
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Cites
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Cited by
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Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
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Becker, B., & Milbourn, T. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.012 · Cited by 676
Levitt, S. D., & Syverson, C. (2008) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.90.4.599 · Cited by 604
Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets
Tadelis, S. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325 · Cited by 524
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505
Metadata
- Authors
- Hubbard, T. N.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-10
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 437-468
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W2115773442
- Cited by
- 85
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 3.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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