The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism
Open accessAbstract
Reputational career concerns provide incentives for short lived agents, but these incentives disappear as an agent reaches retirement. This paper investigates the effects of a market for firm reputations on the life-cycle incentives of firm owners to exert effort. A dynamic general equilibrium model with moral hazard and adverse selection offers two main results. First, incentives of young and old agents are quantitatively equal, implying that incentives are "ageless" with a market for reputations. Second, good reputations cannot act as effective sorting devices: in equilibrium, more able agents cannot outbid lesser ones in the market for good reputations. Finally, welfare analysis shows that social surplus can fall if clients observe trade in firm reputations.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
Lazear, E. P. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260835 · Cited by 2,038
Cited by
The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms
Dellarocas, C. (2003) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1407.17308 · Cited by 3,433
Trust among strangers in internet transactions: Empirical analysis of eBay' s reputation system
Resnick, P., & Zeckhauser, R. (2004) · Advances in Applied Microeconomics · doi:10.1016/s0278-0984(02)11030-3 · Cited by 1,804
Word of mouth communication within online communities: conceptualizing the online social network
Brown, J., Broderick, A. J., & Lee, N. (2007) · Journal of Interactive Marketing · doi:10.1002/dir.20082 · Cited by 1,661
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
Friedman*, E. J., & Resnick, P. (2001) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00173.x · Cited by 536
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505
Metadata
- Authors
- Tadelis, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-08
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 854-882
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W3125164270
- Cited by
- 211
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 20.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.