The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
Abstract
Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of Bayesian confirmation-theoretic enthymemes, and a brief analysis of some recent attempts to resolve the problem of measure sensitivity.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(1988) · Cited by 16,582
Keynes, J. M. (1973) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-00843-8 · Cited by 2,575
Logical Foundations of Probability
Savage, L. J., & Carnap, R. (1952) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907654 · Cited by 2,033
(1990) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/c2009-0-21635-7 · Cited by 1,953
Talmor, E. (1986) · History of European Ideas · doi:10.1016/0191-6599(86)90019-7 · Cited by 1,061
The Logical Foundations of Probability
Kyburg, & Journal of Philosophy, I. (1963) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023655 · Cited by 856
The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning.
FH, & Schum, D. A. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2291371 · Cited by 506
Bayes or bust?: a critical examination of Bayesian confirmation theory
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-2728 · Cited by 504
Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.
Christensen, D., & Earman, J. (1994) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185741 · Cited by 495
Kaplan, M. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804847 · Cited by 461
Cited by
Jones, M., & Love, B. C. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10003134 · Cited by 533
Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence
Isaacs, Y., Hawthorne, J., & Sanford Russell, J. (2022) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-9743809 · Cited by 42
Metadata
- Authors
- Fitelson, B.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- S3
- Pages
- S362-S378
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2086667027
- Cited by
- 280
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 28.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/392738
- The paper
- Fitelson, B. (1999). The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/392738
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.