CoChat

Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition

Jones, Matt, Love, Bradley C. · 2011 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 491 of the 491 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The prominence of Bayesian modeling of cognition has increased recently largely because of mathematical advances in specifying and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models. Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse to psychological or neurological processes and representations. We note commonalities between this rational approach and other movements in psychology – namely, Behaviorism and evolutionary psychology – that set aside mechanistic explanations or make use of optimality assumptions. Through these comparisons, we identify a number of challenges that limit the rational program's potential contribution to psychological theory. Specifically, rational Bayesian models are significantly unconstrained, both because they are uninformed by a wide range of process-level data and because their assumptions about the environment are generally not grounded in empirical measurement. The psychological implications of most Bayesian models are also unclear. Bayesian inference itself is conceptually trivial, but strong assumptions are often embedded in the hypothesis sets and the approximation algorithms used to derive model predictions, without a clear delineation between psychological commitments and implementational details. Comparing multiple Bayesian models of the same task is rare, as is the realization that many Bayesian models recapitulate existing (mechanistic level) theories. Despite the expressive power of current Bayesian models, we argue they must be developed in conjunction with mechanistic considerations to offer substantive explanations of cognition. We lay out several means for such an integration, which take into account the representations on which Bayesian inference operates, as well as the algorithms and heuristics that carry it out. We argue this unification will better facilitate lasting contributions to psychological theory, avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued previous theoretical movements.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0140525x10003134

Cites

491 of 491 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

2 more claims about this paper

Create a free account to see every claim other papers make about this one.

See all claims — free account

Citations

Cites

Show all 491 references

Research works printed but not linked: 18

  1. 10.1207/s15516709cog2703_6 · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2703_6 · Paper page
  2. Ravi, 2009, Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL) and the 4th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing of the AFNLP, 504
  3. 10.1207/s15516709cog2603_6 · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2603_6 · Paper page
  4. Dennis, 1998, Rational models of cognition, 109
  5. 10.1037/0033-295X.109.3.472 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.3.472 · Paper page
  6. Oaksford, 1998a, Rational models of cognition, 1
  7. Michaels, 1981, Direct perception
  8. 10.1037/0033-295X.106.3.551 · DOI · Paper page
  9. Kurz, 1998, Rational models of cognition, 415
  10. Griffiths, 2006, Advances in neural information processing systems, vol. 18, 475
  11. Shiffrin, 1998, Rational models of cognition, 73
  12. 10.1207/s15516709cog0702_3 · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog0702_3 · Paper page
  13. Kant, 1787, Critique of pure reason
  14. Dunbar, 1995, Mechanisms of insight, 365
  15. 10.1037/0033-295X.104.2.266 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.104.2.266 · Paper page
  16. Thibaux, 2007, Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS)
  17. Gigerenzer, 1999, Simple heuristics that make us smart
  18. 10.1037/0033-295X.101.4.608 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.608 · Paper page

Cited by

See all 533

Metadata

Authors
Jones, M., & Love, B. C.
Affiliations
  • University of Colorado Boulder (US)
  • The University of Texas at Austin (US)
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2011-08
Volume
34
Issue
4
Pages
169-188
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2106145030
Cited by
533
References
491
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 93 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 34 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 38 · 2014: 36 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 31
FWCI
31.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
Bayesian models of cognition, rational model, mechanistic explanation, behaviorism, evolutionary psychology, Bayesian inference, mental representation, model comparison
MeSH terms
Bayes Theorem, Behaviorism, Cognition, Humans, Models, Psychological, Psychological Theory, Models, Statistical

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0140525x10003134
The paper
Jones, M., & Love, B. C. (2011). Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10003134

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.