Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 491 of the 491 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The prominence of Bayesian modeling of cognition has increased recently largely because of mathematical advances in specifying and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models. Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse to psychological or neurological processes and representations. We note commonalities between this rational approach and other movements in psychology – namely, Behaviorism and evolutionary psychology – that set aside mechanistic explanations or make use of optimality assumptions. Through these comparisons, we identify a number of challenges that limit the rational program's potential contribution to psychological theory. Specifically, rational Bayesian models are significantly unconstrained, both because they are uninformed by a wide range of process-level data and because their assumptions about the environment are generally not grounded in empirical measurement. The psychological implications of most Bayesian models are also unclear. Bayesian inference itself is conceptually trivial, but strong assumptions are often embedded in the hypothesis sets and the approximation algorithms used to derive model predictions, without a clear delineation between psychological commitments and implementational details. Comparing multiple Bayesian models of the same task is rare, as is the realization that many Bayesian models recapitulate existing (mechanistic level) theories. Despite the expressive power of current Bayesian models, we argue they must be developed in conjunction with mechanistic considerations to offer substantive explanations of cognition. We lay out several means for such an integration, which take into account the representations on which Bayesian inference operates, as well as the algorithms and heuristics that carry it out. We argue this unification will better facilitate lasting contributions to psychological theory, avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued previous theoretical movements.
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“Jones and Love (2011) argued that rational Bayesian models are typically underconstrained, often neglect mechanistic specificity, and risk functioning as metaphors rather than scientific theories.”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Jones and Love 2011
In the citing paper
“Bayesian models can still serve a useful descriptive function in certain contexts (Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Jones and Love 2011
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“This is especially true when priors and likelihoods are fitted retroactively, require strong post hoc assumptions to align with the data, or fail to establish any clear neural implementation of Bayesian principles (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Jones and Love 2011
In the citing paper
“When closely examined, many “Bayesian brain” models function not as process models—particularly in cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry—describing actual neural mechanisms, but as statistical descriptions that characterize behavioral or neural data in Bayesian terms, often retrospectively (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Jones and Love 2011
In the citing paper
“By adjusting free parameters—such as priors, likelihood functions, noise distributions, or assumed processing levels—Bayesian models—particularly in their loosely specified, post hoc applications—an often be tailored to fit virtually any observed data pattern (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Jones and Love 2011
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Metadata
- Authors
- Jones, M., & Love, B. C.
- Affiliations
- University of Colorado Boulder (US)
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2011-08
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 169-188
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2106145030
- Cited by
- 533
- References
- 491
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 93 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 34 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 38 · 2014: 36 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 31
- FWCI
- 31.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- Bayesian models of cognition, rational model, mechanistic explanation, behaviorism, evolutionary psychology, Bayesian inference, mental representation, model comparison
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Behaviorism, Cognition, Humans, Models, Psychological, Psychological Theory, Models, Statistical
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0140525x10003134
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- Jones, M., & Love, B. C. (2011). Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10003134
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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