The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dimensions of Scientific Law
Abstract
Biological knowledge does not fit the image of science that philosophers have developed. Many argue that biology has no laws. Here I criticize standard normative accounts of law and defend an alternative, pragmatic approach. I argue that a multidimensional conceptual framework should replace the standard dichotomous law/accident distinction in order to display important differences in the kinds of causal structure found in nature and the corresponding scientific representations of those structures. To this end I explore the dimensions of stability, strength, and degree of abstraction that characterize the variety of scientific knowledge claims found in biology and other sciences.
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Cites
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Kuhn, T. S., & Schlegel, R. (1963) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3050879 · Cited by 35,538
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
MCGUIRE, J. E. (1963) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1963.tb00813.x · Cited by 8,424
A General Model for the Origin of Allometric Scaling Laws in Biology
West, G. B., Brown, J. H., & Enquist, B. J. (1997) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.276.5309.122 · Cited by 5,016
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1970) · Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171434.009 · Cited by 4,649
Causation, Prediction, and Search
Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., & Scheines, R. (1993) · Lecture Notes in Statistics · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-2748-9 · Cited by 4,617
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1976) · Can Theories be Refuted? · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_14 · Cited by 3,915
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.
Resnik, M. D., & Hempel, C. G. (1966) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2106169 · Cited by 3,319
Lehman, H. (1972) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/288419 · Cited by 2,998
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The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science
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Cited by
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Rousseau, D. M., Manning, J., & Denyer, D. (2008) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520802211651 · Cited by 953
Arjovsky, M., Bottou, L., Gulrajani, I., & Lopez-Paz, D. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1907.02893 · Cited by 927
Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism
Mitchell, S. D. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511802683 · Cited by 637
Self-citationCausation in biology: stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of explanation
Woodward, J. (2010) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-010-9200-z · Cited by 474
Metadata
- Authors
- Mitchell, S. D.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-06
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 242-265
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2061485500
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 37.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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