The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Causation: One Word, Many Things
Open accessAbstract
We currently have on offer a variety of different theories of causation. Many are strikingly good, providing detailed and plausible treatments of exemplary cases; and all suffer from clear counterexamples. I argue that, contra Hume and Kant, this is because causation is not a single, monolithic concept. There are different kinds of causal relations imbedded in different kinds of systems, readily described using thick causal concepts. Our causal theories pick out important and useful structures that fit some familiar cases—cases we discover and ones we devise to fit.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
Expanding the Dimensions of Epistemic Cognition: Arguments From Philosophy and Psychology
CHINN, C. A., BUCKLAND, L. A., & SAMARAPUNGAVAN, A. (2011) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.587722 · Cited by 524
Building Bridges between Structural and Program Evaluation Approaches to Evaluating Policy
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Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment
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Sloman, S. A., & Lagnado, D. (2015) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135 · Cited by 210
Metadata
- Authors
- Cartwright, N.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-12
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 805-819
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2060025708
- Cited by
- 301
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 33.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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