The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences
Abstract
This paper describes an alternative to the common view that explanation in the special sciences involves subsumption under laws. According to this alternative, whether or not a generalization can be used to explain has to do with whether it is invariant rather than with whether it is lawful. A generalization is invariant if it is stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a relevant if it is stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a relevant class of changes. Unlike lawfulness, invariance comes in degrees and has other features that are well suited to capture the characteristics of explanatory generalizations in the special sciences. For example, a generalization can be invariant even if it has exceptions or holds only over a limited spatio-temporal interval. The notion of invariance can be used to resolve a number of dilemmas that arise in standard treatments of explanatory generalizations in the special sciences.
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Citations
Cites
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1989) · doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001 · Cited by 1,821
Explanation and Scientific Understanding
Friedman, M. (1974) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024924 · Cited by 1,386 · cited 1×
“One of the many reasons why this distinction is important is its bearing on unificationist views of explanation like those defended by Friedman ([1974]) and Kitcher ([1989]).”
BackgroundStatistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance
Salmon, W. C. (1971) · doi:10.2307/j.ctt6wrd9p · Cited by 543
Cited by
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Self-citationDiscovering complexity: decomposition and localization as strategies in scientific research
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-6134 · Cited by 1,294
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation
Glennan, S. (2002) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/341857 · Cited by 867
Human Nature and the Limits of Science
Dupré, J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199248060.001.0001 · Cited by 531
Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science
Stenning, K., & van Lambalgen, M. (2008) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7964.001.0001 · Cited by 437
Metadata
- Authors
- Woodward, J.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2000-06-01
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 197-254
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2013353303
- Cited by
- 380
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 125.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
