The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions
Abstract
This paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs. Owing to the anonymity of a large labor market, workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs. This randomness generates coordination frictions. Two workers may apply for a particular job, whereas an identical job gets no applications. The model generates assortative matching, with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers’ and firms’ types. It predicts that a worker’s wage is increasing in her job’s productivity and a firm’s profit is increasing in its employees’ productivity. The model also yields a version of the welfare theorems.
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Citations
Cites
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High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms
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Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings
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Competitive Search Equilibrium
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Assortative Matching and Search
Shimer, R., & Smith, L. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00112 · Cited by 761
Self-citationA Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human Capital Accumulation
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Pricing and Matching with Frictions
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Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differentials
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Sources of Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion: How Much Do Employers Matter?
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Cited by
Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey
Rogerson, R., Shimer, R., & Wright, R. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105775362014 · Cited by 1,051
Self-citationPerformance Pay and Wage Inequality*
Lemieux, T., MacLeod, W. B., & Parent, D. (2009) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.1 · Cited by 549
A Distributional Framework for Matched Employer Employee Data
Bonhomme, S., Lamadon, T., & Manresa, E. (2019) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta15722 · Cited by 282
Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics
Balke, N., & Lamadon, T. (2022) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20161622 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Shimer, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2005-10
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 996-1025
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2107959726
- Cited by
- 341
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 39.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.