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Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning
Abstract
In this paper, I develop Mauricio Suárez's distinction between denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation. I then outline an interpretational account of epistemic representation, according to which a vehicle represents a target for a certain user if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, which would allow them to perform valid (but not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences from the model to the system. The main difference between the interpretational conception I defend here and Suárez's inferential conception is that the interpretational account is a substantial account—interpretation is not just a “symptom” of representation; it is what makes something an epistemic representation of a something else.
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Cites
The Ising model, computer simulation, and universal physics
Hughes, R. I. G. (1999) · Models as Mediators · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511660108.006 · Cited by 181
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MISSing the World. Models as Isolations and Credible Surrogate Systems
Mäki, U. (2009) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-008-9135-9 · Cited by 275
From Responsibility to Reason-Giving Explainable Artificial Intelligence
Baum, K., Mantel, S., Schmidt, E., & Speith, T. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00510-w · Cited by 103
An Inferential Account of Model Explanation
Fang, W. (2019) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-018-9958-9 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Contessa, G.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 48-68
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2003562606
- Cited by
- 240
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 35.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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