The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge
Abstract
What is the relation between coherence and truth? This paper rejects numerous answers to this question, including the following: truth is coherence; coherence is irrelevant to truth; coherence always leads to truth; coherence leads to probability, which leads to truth. I will argue that coherence of the right kind leads to at least approximate truth. The right kind is explanatory coherence, where explanation consists in describing mechanisms. We can judge that a scientific theory is progressively approximating the truth if it is increasing its explanatory coherence in two key respects: broadening by explaining more phenomena and deepening by investigating layers of mechanisms. I sketch an explanation of why deepening is a good epistemic strategy and discuss the prospect of deepening knowledge in the social sciences and everyday life.
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Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392759 · Cited by 3,179
Thagard, P. (1992) · doi:10.1515/9780691186672 · Cited by 1,066
Self-citation
Cited by
Two Views About Explicitly Teaching Nature of Science
Duschl, R. A., & Grandy, R. (2013) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-012-9539-4 · Cited by 370
Kell, D. B., Laubscher, G. J., & Pretorius, E. (2022) · Biochemical Journal · doi:10.1042/bcj20220016 · Cited by 271
Watkins, J., & Manz, E. (2022) · Science Education · doi:10.1002/sce.21747 · Cited by 56
Metadata
- Authors
- Thagard, P.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 28-47
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2011346084
- Cited by
- 191
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 29.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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