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The Leverage Cycle
Abstract
Previous articleNext article FreeThe Leverage CycleJohn GeanakoplosJohn GeanakoplosYale University Search for more articles by this author Yale UniversityPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreI. Introduction to the Leverage CycleAt least since the time of Irving Fisher, economists, as well as the general public, have regarded the interest rate as the most important variable in the economy. But in times of crisis, collateral rates (equivalently margins or leverage) are far more important. Despite the cries of newspapers to lower the interest rates, the Federal Reserve (Fed) would sometimes do much better to attend to the economy-wide leverage and leave the interest rate alone.When a homeowner (or hedge fund or a big investment bank) takes out a loan using, say, a house as collateral, he must negotiate not just the interest rate but how much he can borrow. If the house costs $100, and he borrows $80 and pays $20 in cash, we say that the margin or haircut is 20%, the loan to value (LTV) is $$\$ 80/ \$ 100=80\% $$, and the collateral rate is $$\$ 100/ \$ 80=125\% $$. The leverage is the reciprocal of the margin, namely, the ratio of the asset value to the cash needed to purchase it, or $$\$ 100/ \$ 20=5$$. These ratios are all synonymous.In standard economic theory, the equilibrium of supply and demand determines the interest rate on loans. It would seem impossible that one equation could determine two variables, the interest rate and the margin. But in my theory, supply and demand do determine both the equilibrium leverage (or margin) and the interest rate.It is apparent from everyday life that the laws of supply and demand can determine both the interest rate and leverage of a loan: the more impatient borrowers are, the higher the interest rate; the more nervous the lenders become, or the higher volatility becomes, the higher the collateral they demand. But standard economic theory fails to properly capture these effects, struggling to see how a single supply-equals-demand equation for a loan could determine two variables: the interest rate and the leverage. The theory typically ignores the possibility of default (and thus the need for collateral) or else fixes the leverage as a constant, allowing the equation to predict the interest rate.Yet, variation in leverage has a huge impact on the price of assets, contributing to economic bubbles and busts. This is because, for many assets, there is a class of buyer for whom the asset is more valuable than it is for the rest of the public (standard economic theory, in contrast, assumes that asset prices reflect some fundamental value). These buyers are willing to pay more, perhaps because they are more optimistic, or they are more risk tolerant, or they simply like the assets more. If they can get their hands on more money through more highly leveraged borrowing (that is, getting a loan with less collateral), they will spend it on the assets and drive those prices up. If they lose wealth, or lose the ability to borrow, they will buy less, so the asset will fall into more pessimistic hands and be valued less.In the absence of intervention, leverage becomes too high in boom times and too low in bad times. As a result, in boom times asset prices are too high, and in crisis times they are too low. This is the leverage cycle.Leverage dramatically increased in the United States and globally from 1999 to 2006. A bank that in 2006 wanted to buy a AAA-rated mortgage security could borrow 98.4% of the purchase price, using the security as collateral, and pay only 1.6% in cash. The leverage was thus 100 to 1.6, or about 60 to 1. The average leverage in 2006 across all of the US$2.5 trillion of so-called toxic mortgage securities was about 16 to 1, meaning that the buyers paid down only $150 billion and borrowed the other $2.35 trillion. Home buyers could get a mortgage leveraged 35 to 1, with less than a 3% down payment. Security and house prices soared.Today leverage has been drastically curtailed by nervous lenders wanting more collateral for every dollar loaned. Those toxic mortgage securities are now (in 2009:Q2) leveraged on average only about 1.2 to 1. A homeowner who bought his house in 2006 by taking out a subprime mortgage with only 3% down cannot take out a similar loan today without putting down 30% (unless he qualifies for one of the government rescue programs). The odds are great that he would not have the cash to do it, and reducing the interest rate by 1% or 2% would not change his ability to act. Deleveraging is the main reason the prices of both securities and homes are still falling.The leverage cycle is a recurring phenomenon. The financial derivatives crisis in 1994 that bankrupted Orange County in California was the tail end of a leverage cycle. So was the emerging markets mortgage crisis of 1998, which brought the Connecticut-based hedge fund L
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Metadata
- Authors
- Geanakoplos, J.
- Venue
- NBER Macroeconomics Annual
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2010-01
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-66
- ISSN
- 0889-3365 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-2642
- OpenAlex
- W3125813198
- Cited by
- 493
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 56.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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