The Logic of Explanatory Power
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article introduces and defends a probabilistic measure of the explanatory power that a particular explanans has over its explanandum. To this end, we propose several intuitive, formal conditions of adequacy for an account of explanatory power. Then, we show that these conditions are uniquely satisfied by one particular probabilistic function. We proceed to strengthen the case for this measure of explanatory power by proving several theorems, all of which show that this measure neatly corresponds to our explanatory intuitions. Finally, we briefly describe some promising future projects inspired by our account.
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Citations
Cites
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392759 · Cited by 3,179
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286983 · Cited by 3,174
Explanation and Scientific Understanding
Friedman, M. (1974) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024924 · Cited by 1,386 · cited 1×
“Necessity (Glymour, 1980), statistical relevance (Salmon, 1971), inference and reason (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965), familiarity (Friedman, 1974), unification (Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1989), causation (Woodward, 2003), and mechanism (Machamer et al.”
BackgroundMaking Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance
Salmon, W. C. (1971) · doi:10.2307/j.ctt6wrd9p · Cited by 543
Cited by
Explanatory Preferences Shape Learning and Inference
Lombrozo, T. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.08.001 · Cited by 229
Bayesian networks for interpretable machine learning and optimization
Mihaljević, B., Bielza, C., & Larrañaga, P. (2021) · Neurocomputing · doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2021.01.138 · Cited by 123
“Alternatives include the weight of evidence [56], explanatory power [65,66], likelihood of evidence [67], and the product coherence measure [68], with ongoing debate regarding their merits and shortcomings [69].”
BackgroundDissecting scientific explanation in AI (sXAI): A case for medicine and healthcare
Durán, J. M. (2021) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103498 · Cited by 62
Sober, E. (2020) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-020-00299-5 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Schupbach, J. N., & Sprenger, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2011-01
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 105-127
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2075393375
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 46.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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