Approximation and Idealization: Why the Difference Matters
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
It is proposed that we use the term “approximation” for inexact description of a target system and “idealization” for another system whose properties also provide an inexact description of the target system. Since systems generated by a limiting process can often have quite unexpected—even inconsistent—properties, familiar limit processes used in statistical physics can fail to provide idealizations but merely provide approximations.
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Cites
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286983 · Cited by 3,174 · cited 1×
“In the venerable deductive-nomological (DN) or “covering law” account of explanation of Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), one explains some phenomenon by deducing it from physical laws with the assistance of particular conditions.”
BackgroundStatistical Mechanics of Phase Transitions
Yeomans, J. M. (1992) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198517290.001.0001 · Cited by 809
Time evolution of large classical systems
Lanford, O. E. (1975) · Lecture Notes in Physics · doi:10.1007/3-540-07171-7_1 · Cited by 557
Cited by
Reutlinger, A. (2016) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/687859 · Cited by 116
Metadata
- Authors
- Norton, J. D.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 207-232
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2131050503
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 62.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Norton, J. D. (2012). Approximation and Idealization: Why the Difference Matters. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/664746
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