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Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Open accessAbstract
This paper shows that adding a small application cost to a transfer program can substantially improve targeting through self-selection. Our village-level experiment in Indonesia finds that requiring beneficiaries to apply for benefits results in substantially poorer beneficiaries than automatic enrollment using the same asset test. Marginally increasing application costs on an experimental basis does not further improve targeting. Estimating a model of the application decision implies that the results are largely driven by the nonpoor, who make up the bulk of the population, forecasting that they are unlikely to pass the asset test and therefore not bothering to apply.
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“Yet, despite the relatively small costs, we show that selfselection yielded substantially improved screening; the beneficiaries selected by the application-based method were about 20 percent poorer than those selected through automatic enrollment.”
From Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries (2018) · cites this paper as Alatas et al. (2016)
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Research works printed but not linked: 22
- Alatas Vivi, Working Paper no. 19127, NBER
- Benhassine Najy, Working Paper no. 19227, NBER
- Besley Timothy, 1992, A.E.R., 82, 249
- Bhargava Saurabh, 2015, A.E.R., 105, 3489
- Castaneda Tarsicio, Social Protection Discussion Paper no. 526
- Currie Janet, Poverty, the Distribution of Income, and Public Policy
- 10.1353/urb.2001.0005 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1002/pam.20481 · DOI
- 10.1080/01621459.1992.10476255 · DOI · Paper page
- Gentzkow Matthew, 2014, Shapiro
- Grosh Margaret, 2008, Emil Tesliuc, and Azedine Ouerghi.
- 10.1086/381250 · DOI · Paper page
- Hodges Anthony, 2007, Tuya Mungan, and Uranchimeg Budragchaa.
- Kidd Stephen, Targeting the Poorest: An Assessment of the Proxy Means Test Methodology
- 10.1257/pol.3.1.54 · DOI · Paper page
- Lindert Kathy, Social Protection Discussion Paper no. 709
- 10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.4.886 · DOI
- Nichols Albert L, 1982, A.E.R., 72, 372
- Nichols D., E., 1971, A.E.R., 61, 312
- 10.1086/261781 · DOI
- 10.1093/wbro/6.2.153 · DOI
- 10.1002/hec.1635 · DOI
Cited by
Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs
Deshpande, M., & Li, Y. (2019) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20180076 · Cited by 534
Take-Up and Targeting: Experimental Evidence from SNAP
Finkelstein, A., & Notowidigdo, M. J. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjz013 · Cited by 314
Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries
Hanna, R., & Olken, B. A. (2018) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.32.4.201 · Cited by 299
Self-citationDuflo, E. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.p20171153 · Cited by 258
Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs
Deshpande, M., & Li, Y. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3342780 · Cited by 198
Muralidharan, K., & Niehaus, P. (2017) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.31.4.103 · Cited by 194
Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Kyle, J., Olken, B. A., & Sumarto, S. (2018) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/696226 · Cited by 95
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., Purnamasari, R., & Wai-Poi, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2016-04
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 371-427
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2297629598
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 43.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.