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The Policy Elasticity
Open accessAbstract
This paper illustrates how one can use causal effects of a policy change to measure its welfare impact without decomposing them into income and substitution effects. Often, a single causal effect suffices: the impact on government revenue. Because these responses vary with the policy in question, I term them policy elasticities to distinguish them from Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities. The model also formally justifies a simple benefit-cost ratio to measure the marginal value of public funds corresponding to non-budget neutral policies. Using existing causal estimates, I apply the framework to five policy changes: top income tax rate, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) generosity, food stamps, job training, and housing vouchers.
Overview
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TL;DR
Hendren shows that welfare analysis of a policy change can use the policy’s causal effects directly, without decomposing them into income and substitution effects; often the causal effect on government revenue suffices. The paper defines “policy elasticities” and a marginal value of public funds (MVPF) benefit-cost ratio, then applies existing causal estimates to five U.S. policies.
Key findings
- In models where government taxation is the only pre-existing distortion, the causal impact of the behavioral response on the government budget is sufficient for all behavioral responses; the envelope theorem means responses do not affect utility directly but impose a fiscal externality.
- For non-budget-neutral policies affecting taxes, transfers, or market goods, the MVPF is \(1/(1-BR)\), where \(BR\) is the behavioral response’s impact on the government budget per dollar of expenditure; for publicly provided goods, one adjusts by beneficiaries’ willingness to pay relative to income.
- Applications using existing estimates: top tax rate MVPF $1.33–$2 (25–50% of mechanical revenue lost); EITC expansion MVPF $0.88 (cost ~14% above mechanical: 9% extensive + 5% intensive); food stamps MVPF 0.53–0.661 (or 0.8–1 if no behavioral response); job training MVPF 0–1.85 (1.52 under no comparative advantage); housing vouchers MVPF 0.79 in Table 1 (text says 0.78).
- Combining EITC and top-tax MVPFs implies additional redistribution is desirable iff one prefers $0.44–$0.66 in an EITC recipient’s hands relative to $1 to someone subject to the top marginal rate (income > ~$400K).
Methods
- Theoretical model: a continuum of individuals choosing goods and labor, with government taxes, transfers, and publicly provided goods; a policy path \(P(\theta)\); policy response/elasticity defined as the local causal effect; marginal willingness to pay derived via the envelope theorem and aggregated with social marginal utilities; MVPF defined for non-budget-neutral policies.
- Applications: uses existing causal estimates from the literature to calculate MVPF for five U.S. policy changes: top marginal income tax rate, EITC generosity, food stamps (SNAP), job training (JTPA), and housing vouchers (Section 8). Sources include Saez et al. (2012), Giertz (2009), Hotz and Scholz (2003), Chetty et al. (2013), Whitmore (2002), Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012), Bloom et al. (1997), Reeder (1985), and Jacob and Ludwig (2012).
- Analysis compares MVPFs across policies using social marginal utilities of income, interpreted via Okun’s leaky-bucket experiment; Appendix F constructs revenue impacts from component behavioral responses.
Limitations
- Paper-stated: application calculations rely on assumptions—e.g., no spillovers below the top-tax threshold, no income shifting across tax bases for top earners; EITC no effects on ineligible groups or marriage/family formation and only ordinary labor income affects revenue; food-stamp behavioral response is imprecisely estimated and not statistically different from zero; job-training willingness to pay is uncertain (MVPF could be zero); housing-voucher estimates do not capture ex-ante labor supply and may have landlord capture (~0.13).
- Paper-stated: sufficiency of the fiscal externality holds when government taxation is the only distortion; with other externalities one also needs the causal impact on those externalities. General equilibrium effects require tracking causal price effects. Non-marginal welfare analysis requires conditions such as the marginal utility of income not varying and causal effects linear in \(\theta\).
- Text-evident: the paper is a theoretical clarification and synthesis, not new empirical estimation; MVPF values depend on existing causal estimates and on subjective social marginal utilities of income (or the inequality deflator). The model assumes simplified production (one unit of labor produces one unit of any good under perfect competition), ruling out imperfect competition, production externalities, and pecuniary externalities unless added.
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0 Valid · 6 Not valid · 82 Not checked · 191 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Proposition 1. The marginal welfare impact to individual i of pursuing policy path P ( θ ) is given by:”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“This implies MVPF Rich P Tax is between 1.33 and 2, as reported in the first row of Table 1.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Hence, the marginal value of public funds of the EITC policy is roughly MVPF Poor P EITC = 0 . 88 .”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“Job Training | 0-1.22 | 1.52 | 0 to 1.85 | Bloom et al (1997), Appendix A Calculations”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Bloom et al (1997) source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Combining the estimates together, the MVPF for food stamps is estimated at 0.53 to 0.64, depending on whether one takes the Smeeding (1982) estimate versus the Whitmore (2002) estimate for the cash-value of the food stamps to beneficiaries.”
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 66
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“which itself notes that the mathematical definition of the MVPF is not new.”
From Welfare Analysis Meets Causal Inference (2020) · cites this paper as Hendren (2016)
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 3 Applications · p. 23
“| Food Stamps | 0.8 to 0 | 0.661”
§ F.2 Food Stamps · p. 46
“Smeeding (1982) estimates that food stamps are valued dollar-for-dollar. In contrast, Whitmore (2002) estimates that every dollar of food stamps is valued at ~$0.80 by the beneficiaries.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“expressed as a fraction of the net resource transfer, this is -922.60/1,741.85 = 0.132.”
Reported 0.132 · recomputed -0.529667
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“expressed as a fraction of the net resource transfer, this is -588.6/1,153.25 = -0.338.”
Reported -0.338 · recomputed -0.510384
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“the MVPF would be 0.88 - 0.27 = 0.51.”
Reported 0.51 · recomputed 0.61
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ F.3 Section 8 Housing Vouchers · p. 46
“For the change in Medicare enrollment, I use costs compiled by Holahan and McMorrow (2012).”
§ F.3 Section 8 Housing Vouchers · p. 46
“Jacob and Ludwig (2012) study the impact of obtaining a housing voucher on labor supply (intensive + extensive), Medicaid receipt, TANF receipt, and SNAP receipt.”
Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hendren, N.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Corresponding author
- Hendren, Nathaniel
- ORCID
- Hendren, Nathaniel
- Venue
- Tax Policy and the Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2016-01
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 51-89
- ISSN
- 0892-8649 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-2650
- OpenAlex
- W3125638639
- Cited by
- 105
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 10.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Tax Policy and the Economy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
- Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
- Keywords
- government revenue, benefit-cost ratio, top income tax rates, Earned Income Tax Credit, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, job training, housing vouchers, causal effects, income and substitution effects
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