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The Policy Elasticity

Open access
Hendren, Nathaniel·2016·Tax Policy and the Economy

Abstract

This paper illustrates how one can use causal effects of a policy change to measure its welfare impact without decomposing them into income and substitution effects. Often, a single causal effect suffices: the impact on government revenue. Because these responses vary with the policy in question, I term them policy elasticities to distinguish them from Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities. The model also formally justifies a simple benefit-cost ratio to measure the marginal value of public funds corresponding to non-budget neutral policies. Using existing causal estimates, I apply the framework to five policy changes: top income tax rate, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) generosity, food stamps, job training, and housing vouchers.

Overview

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TL;DR

Hendren shows that welfare analysis of a policy change can use the policy’s causal effects directly, without decomposing them into income and substitution effects; often the causal effect on government revenue suffices. The paper defines “policy elasticities” and a marginal value of public funds (MVPF) benefit-cost ratio, then applies existing causal estimates to five U.S. policies.

Key findings

  • In models where government taxation is the only pre-existing distortion, the causal impact of the behavioral response on the government budget is sufficient for all behavioral responses; the envelope theorem means responses do not affect utility directly but impose a fiscal externality.
  • For non-budget-neutral policies affecting taxes, transfers, or market goods, the MVPF is \(1/(1-BR)\), where \(BR\) is the behavioral response’s impact on the government budget per dollar of expenditure; for publicly provided goods, one adjusts by beneficiaries’ willingness to pay relative to income.
  • Applications using existing estimates: top tax rate MVPF $1.33–$2 (25–50% of mechanical revenue lost); EITC expansion MVPF $0.88 (cost ~14% above mechanical: 9% extensive + 5% intensive); food stamps MVPF 0.53–0.661 (or 0.8–1 if no behavioral response); job training MVPF 0–1.85 (1.52 under no comparative advantage); housing vouchers MVPF 0.79 in Table 1 (text says 0.78).
  • Combining EITC and top-tax MVPFs implies additional redistribution is desirable iff one prefers $0.44–$0.66 in an EITC recipient’s hands relative to $1 to someone subject to the top marginal rate (income > ~$400K).

Methods

  • Theoretical model: a continuum of individuals choosing goods and labor, with government taxes, transfers, and publicly provided goods; a policy path \(P(\theta)\); policy response/elasticity defined as the local causal effect; marginal willingness to pay derived via the envelope theorem and aggregated with social marginal utilities; MVPF defined for non-budget-neutral policies.
  • Applications: uses existing causal estimates from the literature to calculate MVPF for five U.S. policy changes: top marginal income tax rate, EITC generosity, food stamps (SNAP), job training (JTPA), and housing vouchers (Section 8). Sources include Saez et al. (2012), Giertz (2009), Hotz and Scholz (2003), Chetty et al. (2013), Whitmore (2002), Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012), Bloom et al. (1997), Reeder (1985), and Jacob and Ludwig (2012).
  • Analysis compares MVPFs across policies using social marginal utilities of income, interpreted via Okun’s leaky-bucket experiment; Appendix F constructs revenue impacts from component behavioral responses.

Limitations

  • Paper-stated: application calculations rely on assumptions—e.g., no spillovers below the top-tax threshold, no income shifting across tax bases for top earners; EITC no effects on ineligible groups or marriage/family formation and only ordinary labor income affects revenue; food-stamp behavioral response is imprecisely estimated and not statistically different from zero; job-training willingness to pay is uncertain (MVPF could be zero); housing-voucher estimates do not capture ex-ante labor supply and may have landlord capture (~0.13).
  • Paper-stated: sufficiency of the fiscal externality holds when government taxation is the only distortion; with other externalities one also needs the causal impact on those externalities. General equilibrium effects require tracking causal price effects. Non-marginal welfare analysis requires conditions such as the marginal utility of income not varying and causal effects linear in \(\theta\).
  • Text-evident: the paper is a theoretical clarification and synthesis, not new empirical estimation; MVPF values depend on existing causal estimates and on subjective social marginal utilities of income (or the inequality deflator). The model assumes simplified production (one unit of labor produces one unit of any good under perfect competition), ruling out imperfect competition, production externalities, and pecuniary externalities unless added.

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 17

  1. Angrist J., Mostly Harmless Econometrics
  2. Auerbach A., Handbook of Public Economics, ed. Alan J. Auerbach and Martin S. Feldstein.
  3. Auerbach A. J., 2002, Philadelphia: Elsevier., 3
  4. Browning E., 1987, American Economic Review, 77, 11
  5. Diamond P. A., 1971, American Economic Review, 61, 261
  6. Giertz S. H., 2000, Tax Policy Lessons from the
  7. Harberger A., 1964, American Economic Review, 54, 58
  8. Hendren N., NBER working paper no. 20351
  9. Hotz J., 2003, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  10. Kleven H. J., 2005, Danish Journal of Economics, 143, 321
  11. Mas-Colell A., 1995, New York: Oxford University Press.
  12. Mirrlees J. A., 2011, Design: The Mirrlees Review, ed. James Mirrlees.
  13. Okun A., Equality and Efficiency
  14. Pigou A., A Study in Public Finance
  15. Rice D., 2006, Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
  16. Schlee E. E., Working Paper
  17. Whitmore D., Industrial Relations Section Working Paper no. 468

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Metadata

Authors
Hendren, N.
Affiliations
National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Corresponding author
Hendren, Nathaniel
Venue
Tax Policy and the Economy
Published
2016-01
Volume
30
Issue
1
Pages
51-89
ISSN
  • 0892-8649 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-2650
OpenAlex
W3125638639
Cited by
105
References
41
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 4
FWCI
10.13
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Tax Policy and the Economy (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
Keywords
government revenue, benefit-cost ratio, top income tax rates, Earned Income Tax Credit, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, job training, housing vouchers, causal effects, income and substitution effects

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