The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
Open accessAbstract
This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous preferences. The model departs from the Gale and Shapley model by assuming that a finite number of agents on one side (colleges) are matched to a continuum of agents on the other side (students). We show that stable matchings correspond to solutions of supply and demand equations, with the selectivity of each college playing a role similar to that of prices. We apply the model to an analysis of how competition induced by school choice gives schools incentives to invest in quality and to asymptotics of school choice mechanisms.
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Citations
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Cited by
Are Some Degrees Worth More than Others? Evidence from college admission cutoffs in Chile
Hastings, J., Neilson, C., & Zimmerman, S. (2013) · doi:10.3386/w19241 · Cited by 234
Why Don’t Elite Colleges Expand Supply?
Blair, P., & Smetters, K. (2021) · doi:10.3386/w29309 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Azevedo, E. M., & Leshno, J. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2016-10
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1235-1268
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2520078259
- Cited by
- 312
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 58.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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