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Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Open accessAbstract
The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school—single tiebreaking—in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)
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Cites
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
Cited by
The Missing "One-Offs": The Hidden Supply of High-Achieving, Low Income Students
Hoxby, C., & Avery, C. (2012) · doi:10.3386/w18586 · Cited by 511
What Parents Want: School Preferences and School Choice
Burgess, S., Greaves, E., Vignoles, A., & Wilson, D. (2015) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12153 · Cited by 377
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
Azevedo, E. M., & Leshno, J. D. (2016) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/687476 · Cited by 312
Pathak, P. A., & Sönmez, T. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.80 · Cited by 312
Self-citationHaeringer, G., & Klijn, F. (2009) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.002 · Cited by 276
Metadata
- Authors
- Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-12-01
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1954-1978
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122595055
- Cited by
- 500
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 54.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009). Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
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