Wishful Thinking and Values in Science
Abstract
This article examines the concept of wishful thinking in philosophical literature on science and values. It suggests that this term tends to be used in an overly broad manner that fails to distinguish between separate types of bias, mechanisms that generate biases, and general theories that might explain those mechanisms. I explain how confirmation bias is distinct from wishful thinking and why it is more useful for examining the relationship between cognitive bias and beliefs about the existence of injustices.
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Confirmation bias can take effect in the absence of a preferred view and might lead one to support even beliefs that one wants to be false.
“So confirmation bias is also importantly different from motivated reasoning, as it can take effect in the absence of a preferred view and might lead one to support even beliefs that one wants to be false (e.g., when one believes the catastrophic effects of climate change are unavoidable; Steel 2018).”
From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Steel 2018
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References 32 · Cited by 13
- Authors
- Steel, D.
- Corresponding author
- Steel, Daniel
- ORCID
- Steel, Daniel
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2018-12
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 895-905
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2884004332
- Cited by
- 13
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 1.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- wishful thinking, confirmation bias, cognitive biases, values in science, epistemic bias
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