What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias?

In Hall et al. (2012), participants subsequently tended to justify positions they thought they held despite just having chosen the opposite.

“Moreover, they subsequently tended to justify positions they thought they held despite just having chosen the opposite.”

• cites Hall et al. (2012) sourceSupported

Hall et al. (2012) found that 69% of participants failed to detect at least one change in moral statements whose meaning was inverted.

“Surprisingly, 69% of the study participants failed to detect at least one of the changes.”

• cites Hall et al. (2012) sourceSupported

Confirmation bias makes people less able to anticipate and adequately respond to their interlocutor's point of view.

“In fueling one-sided information processing to support one's own view, the bias makes people less able to anticipate and adequately respond to their interlocutor's point of view (Dutilh Novaes 2018: 520).”

• cites Dutilh Novaes 2018 sourceSupported

The concept of 'group selection' is problematic.

“While I have sympathies with this proposal, several researchers have noted that the concept of 'group selection' is problematic (West et al. 2007;Pinker 2012).”

• cites West et al. 2007 sourceSupported
• cites Pinker 2012Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

A significant amount of our beliefs are likely to be social ones.

“A significant amount of our beliefs are thus likely to be social ones (Tomasello 2014: 190f).”

• cites Tomasello 2014 sourcePartly supported

  The “Implications for Cognition and Morality” section (page unavailable in our copy) describes human thinking as shaped by social perspectives, shared intentionality, and group norms. That supports the idea that some beliefs are social, but the paper does not establish that a significant amount of our beliefs are social ones. (LLM, conf=0.78)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

People have a strong readiness to favorably respond to babies' distinctive facial features.

“Studies suggest that people have a strong readiness to favorably respond to babies' distinctive facial features.”

• cites Zebrowitz and Montepare 2008 sourceSupported

Our beliefs about people's social standing, knowledge, intentions, abilities, etc. are critical for our flourishing.

“as noted, we are ultra-social and ultra-cooperative, and our beliefs about people's social standing, knowledge, intentions, abilities, etc. are critical for our flourishing (Sterelny 2007: 720;Tomasello 2014: 190f;Henrich 2016).”

• cites Sterelny 2007: 720 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Tomasello 2014: 190f sourceSupported
• cites Henrich 2016 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Confirmation bias would have been adaptive in the past in sustaining SFPs of social conceptions, including negative stereotypes.

“In sustaining SFPs of these conceptions, which might have included various stereotypes or ethnocentric, prejudicial attitudes that we today consider offensive negative trait ascriptions (e.g., gender or racist stereotypes) (Whitaker et al. 2018), confirmation bias would have been adaptive in the past.”

• cites Whitaker et al. 2018 sourceSupported

The more affected one is by confirmation bias, the stronger one's belief in one's trait ascriptions to A.

“given what we know about the cognitive effect of the bias, the more affected you are by the bias, the stronger your belief in your trait ascriptions to A (Rabin and Schrag 1999)”

• cites Rabin and Schrag 1999 sourcePartly supported

  Section 3, “Confirmatory Bias and Belief Formation” (page unavailable), says the bias leads agents to be overconfident in a favored hypothesis. The Introduction (page unavailable) adds that sufficiently strong bias can drive an agent toward believing more strongly in a false hypothesis. These findings support the proposed tendency, but not the unqualified claim that greater bias always produces stronger belief in a trait ascription. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Attitude strength in politically relevant domains increases selective exposure constitutive of confirmation bias.

“In fact, in psychology, attitude strength, especially, in politically relevant domains of thinking has long been and still is widely accepted to increase the kind of selective exposure constitutive of confirmation bias (Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2015: 173).”

• cites Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2015: 173 sourceCould not verify

  The available passage is a bibliographic entry, not a discussion of attitude strength or selective exposure. Searches for the claimed relationship and for preferences for attitude-consistent political information returned no substantive passage, so our copy does not establish whether the paper supports the claim. (LLM, conf=0.72)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

The RM account can explain why confirmation bias is particularly strong in groups in which shared ideologies are at stake.

“The account can also explain why confirmation bias is particularly strong in groups in which shared ideologies are at stake (Taber and Lodge 2006;Gerken 2019).”

• cites Taber and Lodge 2006 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Gerken 2019 sourcePartly supported

  The accepted manuscript (pp. 9–10) describes motivated cognition as favoring antecedent views and says identity-protective cognition may explain backfire effects in groups whose social identities are implicated. It does not establish that confirmation bias is generally *particularly strong* in such groups; on p. 19, it cautions against overestimating backfire effects. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

The concept of group selection is problematic when it comes to traits threatening an individual's fitness.

“I noted that the concept of 'group selection' is problematic when it comes to traits threatening an individual's fitness (West et al. 2007;Pinker 2012)”

• cites West et al. 2007 sourceSupported
• cites Pinker 2012Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Subjects who are highly confident about their political beliefs are more likely to convince others.

“It is also because subjects who are highly confident about their political beliefs are more likely to be able to convince other people of them too (Kappes et al. 2020).”

• cites Kappes et al. 2020 sourcePartly supported

  The Abstract says people are generally more influenced by opinions expressed with high confidence. But the paper does not establish this specifically for political beliefs, and its results section finds that participants used another person's confidence when the opinion confirmed their own judgment, not when it contradicted it. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Neuroscientific data show that a positive view of one's own traits tends to correlate with reduced activation of the right inferior prefrontal gyrus when the subject receives negative self-related information.

“Relatedly, neuroscientific data show that a positive view of one's own traits tends to correlate with a reduced activation of the right inferior prefrontal gyrus, which is the area of the brain processing selfrelated content, when the subject receives negative self-related information(Sharot et al. 2011).”

• cites Sharot et al. 2011 sourcePartly supported

  The Results section ('Trait optimism, biased updating, and BOLD signal'; page unavailable) reports that participants high in trait optimism showed weaker right-IFG tracking of undesirable estimation errors. The study concerns information about the likelihood of adverse events in one's future, not negative information about one's traits. It also does not establish that the right IFG is an area for processing self-related content generally. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Optimists about themselves display a diminished sensitivity for negative information that is in tension with self-related trait optimism.

“That is, optimists about themselves display a diminished sensitivity for negative information that is in tension with self-related trait optimism (ibid).”

• cites Sharot et al. 2011 sourceSupported

Evolutionary explanations typically involve integrating diverse data from different disciplines and thereby contribute to a more complete understanding of traits and human cognition.

“Moreover, they typically involve integrating diverse data from different disciplines (e.g., psychology, biology, anthropology etc.), and thereby contribute to the development of a more complete understanding of the traits at play and human cognition, in general (Tooby and Cosmides 2015).”

• cites Tooby and Cosmides 2015 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Trouche et al. (2016) found that subjects are less critical of their own arguments than of other people's.

“This suggests that subjects are less critical of their own arguments than of other people's, indicating that confirmation bias is real and perhaps often operative when we are considering our own claims and arguments.”

• cites Trouche et al. (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Ancestral hunter-gatherer groups are perhaps unlikely to have displayed a diversity of viewpoints.

“Crucially, ancestral 'hunter-gather' groups are perhaps unlikely to have displayed a diversity of viewpoints.”

The intention-alignment proposal seems at odds with the finding that confirmation bias inclines subjects to ignore or misconstrue their opponents' objections.

“However, the proposal seems at odds with the finding that the bias inclines subjects to ignore or misconstrue their opponents' objections.”

If human reasoning emerged for argumentative purposes, the existence of confirmation bias remains puzzling.

“If human reasoning emerged for argumentative purposes, the existence of the bias remains puzzling.”

About half of Trouche et al.'s participants did not notice that they were presented with their own arguments again.

“About half of the participants didn't notice that by the experimenter's intervention, in some trials, they were in fact presented with their own arguments again; the arguments appeared to these participants as if they were someone else's.”

• cites Trouche et al. (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Even today groups often display homogeneity, as calls for diversity in academia, companies, etc. indicate.

“Even today groups often display such homogeneity, as calls for diversity in academia, companies etc. indicate.”

The point that a trait good for groups but bad for individual fitness will not spread applies to the proposal that confirmation bias was selected for group-level benefits.

“The point equally applies to the proposal that confirmation bias was selected for its group-level benefits.”

An anticipated objection is likely to be answered more convincingly than an immediate response from one's audience.

“For instance, an anticipated objection is likely to be answered more convincingly than an immediate response from one's audience.”

These points provide reasons to doubt that ancestral groups provided the conditions in which confirmation bias could have produced the benefits that the group-cognition account highlights rather than maladaptive effects tied to group polarization.

“These points provide reasons to doubt that ancestral groups provided the kind of conditions in which confirmation bias could have produced the benefits that the group-cognition account highlights rather than maladaptive effects tied to group polarization.”

Reality matching frequently occurs when the beliefs at issue are about people and social structures.

“I call this process reality matching and contend that it frequently occurs when the beliefs at issue are about people and social structures (i.e., relationships between individuals, groups, and socio-political institutions).”

SFPs typically depend on whether the targets of the trait ascriptions involved accept the expectations imposed on them via the ascriptions.

“One common explanation of this asymmetry is that SFPs typically depend on whether the targets of the trait ascriptions involved accept the expectations imposed on them via the ascriptions (Snyder and Klein 2007).”

• cites Snyder and Klein 2007 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The reality-matching account challenges a key assumption underlying current research on the bias, namely that the bias thwarts reliable belief formation and truth tracking.

“I discuss three recent proposals of the adaptationist kind, mention reservations about them, and develop a novel account of the evolution of confirmation bias that challenges a key assumption underlying current research on the bias, namely that the bias thwarts reliable belief formation and truth tracking.”

Due to its role in helping us make social reality match our beliefs, confirmation bias is adaptive.

“Due to its role in helping us make social reality match our beliefs, confirmation bias is adaptive, or so I will argue.”

Even today, positive SFPs in individual, dyadic interactions are more likely and pronounced than negative ones.

“Indeed, there is evidence that even today, positive SFPs in individual, dyadic interactions are more likely and pronounced than negative ones.”

• cites Willard et al. (2008) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Willard and Madon 2016 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Madon et al. 1997 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

All three proposals of the adaptive role of confirmation bias considered so far raise questions.

“All three proposals of the adaptive role of confirmation bias considered so far thus raise questions.”

The more convinced one is about a trait ascription to A, the clearer one's signaling of the corresponding expectations to A in one's behavior.

“Relatedly, the more convinced you are about your trait ascription to A, the clearer your signaling of the corresponding expectations to A in your behavior (Tormala 2016)”

• cites Tormala 2016 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

This makes SFPs of these beliefs more likely than if the ascriber merely verbally attributed the traits without committing to the truth of the ascriptions, or believed in them but readily revised the beliefs.

“This makes SFPs of these beliefs more likely than if the ascriber merely verbally attributed the traits without committing to the truth of the ascriptions, or believed in them but readily revised the beliefs.”

If A is confident that he has T, he will be more likely to conform to the corresponding expectations than if he doesn't believe the ascription.

“Crucially, if A too is confident that he has T, he will be more likely to conform to the corresponding expectations than if he doesn't believe the ascription, say, because he notices that you only say but don't believe that he has T.”

Self-fulfilling prophecies can be pernicious when the beliefs at the center capture negative social conceptions, such as stereotypes, anxious expectations, fear, or hostility.

“Importantly, SFPs can be pernicious when the beliefs at the center of them capture negative social conceptions, for instance, stereotypes, anxious expectations, fear, or hostility (Darley and Gross 1983;Downey et al. 1998;Madon et al. 2018).”

• cites Darley and Gross 1983 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Downey et al. 1998 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Madon et al. 2018 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

About 70% of the general population has a positive self-conception.

“This is well established when it comes to one's beliefs about oneself (about 70% of the general population has a positive self-conception; Talaifar and Swann 2017: 4) and one's family members (Wenger and Fowers 2008).”

• cites Talaifar and Swann 2017 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Wenger and Fowers 2008 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

In ancestral groups of heavily interdependent subjects, the SFPs of the social conceptions were more often than not adaptive.

“If we combine these considerations with the assumption that in ancestral groups of heavily interdependent subjects, positive social beliefs about in-group members (in-group favoritism) are likely to have been more prevalent than negative ones, then there is reason to hold that the SFPs of the social conceptions in the groups at issue were more often than not adaptive.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: In ancestral groups of heavily interdependent subjects, positive social beliefs about in-group members (in-group favoritism) are likely to have been more prevalent than negative ones.

Confirmation bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them.

“According to the account, confirmation bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them.”

Reality does not always remain unchanged when we form beliefs about it.

“However, reality doesn't always remain unchanged when we form beliefs about it.”

Self-fulfilling prophecies of initially false positive trait ascriptions emerge in many situations, including ascriptions of being tidy, charitable, cooperative, kind, eco-friendly, militarily competent, athletic, and physiological changes.

“SFPs of initially false positive trait ascriptions emerge in many other situations too.They also occurred, for instance, when adults ascribed to children traits such as being tidy (Miller et al. 1975), charitable (Jensen and Moore 1977), or cooperative (Grusec et al. 1978).”

• cites Miller et al. 1975 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Jensen and Moore 1977 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Grusec et al. 1978 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Due to that effect, confirmation bias arguably makes an intention alignment with others, especially with one's opponents, harder, not easier.

“Due to that effect, the bias arguably makes an intention alignment with others (especially with one's opponents) harder, not easier.”

The better one conveys to A one's conviction that A has T, the more confident A will be that he has T, assuming A trusts the ascriber.

“Additionally, the better you are at conveying to A your conviction that he has T, the more confident he himself will be that he has that trait (assuming he trusts you) (Sniezek and Van Swol 2001).”

• cites Sniezek and Van Swol 2001 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: A trusts the ascriber.

Subjects respond more to positive than negative expectations.

“they respond more to positive than negative expectations (Madon et al. 1997: 792)”

• cites Madon et al. 1997: 792 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Confirmation bias plays an important role in allowing subjects to become and remain convinced about their social beliefs (e.g., trait ascriptions) when the available evidence doesn't yet support their truth.

“I suggest that confirmation bias plays an important role: it allows subjects to become and remain convinced about their social beliefs (e.g., trait ascriptions) when the available evidence doesn't yet support their truth.”

Subjects tend to strive to think well of themselves.

“since subjects tend to strive to think well of themselves (Talaifar and Swann 2017)”

• cites Talaifar and Swann 2017 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

A confirmation bias pertaining to social beliefs reinforces our confidence in these beliefs, strengthening our tendency to behave in ways that cause changes in reality so that it corresponds to the beliefs, turning them, when initially inaccurate, into self-fulfilling prophecies.

“I shall contend that a confirmation bias pertaining to social beliefs reinforces our confidence in these beliefs, therewith strengthening our tendency to behave in ways that cause changes in reality so that it corresponds to the beliefs, turning them (when they are initially inaccurate) into self-fulfilling prophecies (SFPs) (Merton 1948;Biggs 2009).”

• cites Merton 1948 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Biggs 2009Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

In these situations, confirmation bias is highly effective for us to be confident about our beliefs even when there is insufficient evidence or subjective motivation available to us to support them.

“In these situations, confirmation bias is highly effective for us to be confident about our beliefs even when there is insufficient evidence or subjective motivation available to us to support them.”

In ultra-cooperative social environments where tribe members held predominantly positive social conceptions and expectations about ingroup subjects, positive SFPs should have been overall more frequent and stronger than negative ones.

“Given these points, in 'ultra-cooperative' social environments in which 'tribe' members held predominantly positive social conceptions and expectations about ingroup subjects, positive SFPs should have been overall more frequent and stronger than negative ones.”

People display confirmation bias with respect to beliefs that can't produce SFPs (e.g., beliefs about physics, climate change, religion).

“But they do (Nickerson 1998).”

• cites Nickerson 1998 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Interactions between powerful and powerless individuals are conducive to reality matching of the powerful individuals' social beliefs.

“That is, interactions between powerful and powerless individuals are conducive to reality matching of the powerful individuals' social beliefs.”

Confirmation bias is adaptive in facilitating a social extension of the process of making trait ascriptions match reality.

“Since this process is in ultra-social and ultra-cooperative groups more often than not adaptive (e.g., boosting the development of a positive trait in A), in facilitating a social extension of it, confirmation bias is adaptive too.”

Confirmation bias might have been selected for sustaining SFPs.

“If we add to these points that SFPs of trait ascriptions were in developmental and educational contexts in ancestral tribal groups more often beneficial for the targets than not, then there is a basis for holding that confirmation bias might in fact have been selected for sustaining SFPs.”

Powerful individuals are more likely to prompt subordinates to behaviorally confirm their social conceptions than relatively powerless subjects.

“For instance, powerful individuals have been found to be more likely to prompt subordinates to behaviorally confirm their social conceptions than relatively powerless subjects (Copeland 1994;Leyens et al. 1999).”

• cites Copeland 1994 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Leyens et al. 1999 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

According to the RM account, powerful individuals should display a stronger confirmation bias with respect to relevant social beliefs.

“According to the RM account, powerful individuals should display a stronger confirmation bias with respect to the relevant social beliefs.”

In ancestral groups, many of the social conceptions that subjects unreflectively acquired during their upbringing and socialization were geared toward preserving the group's function and status quo and aligning individuals with them.

“Secondly, in ancestral groups, many of the social conceptions (e.g., beliefs about social roles, gender norms, stereotypes etc.) that subjects unreflectively acquired during their upbringing and socialization will have been geared toward preserving the group's function and status quo and aligning individuals with them (Sterelny 2006: 148).”

• cites Sterelny 2006: 148 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Confirmation bias is adaptive by helping subjects make social reality match their beliefs about it no matter whether they favor these beliefs or the latter are sufficiently evidentially supported.

“By helping subjects make social reality match their beliefs about it no matter whether they favor these beliefs or the latter are sufficiently evidentially supported, confirmation bias is adaptive:”

When we automatically reinforce any of our views no matter whether we favor them, our preferences are not required for and do not undermine the reinforcement process and the SFPs promoted by it.

“Notice that when we automatically reinforce any of our views no matter whether we favor them, then our preferences won't be required for and undermine the reinforcement process and the SFPs promoted by it.”

When confirmation bias targets positive social beliefs and trait ascriptions, it serves both the subject and the group by producing effects that assist them in their development and make social cognition more tractable.

“when the bias targets positive social beliefs and trait ascriptions, it serves both the subject and the group by producing effects that (1) assist them in their development (to become, e.g., more communicative, cooperative, or knowledgeable) and (2) make social cognition more tractable (by increasing social conformity and predictability).”

A confirmation bias in each member of the group would have helped the group enlist each of its members for re-producing social identities, social structures, traits, and roles in the image of the group's conceptions even when these individuals disfavored them.

“Since it can operate independently of a subject's preferences, a confirmation bias in each member of the group would have helped the group enlist each of its members for re-producing social identities, social structures, traits, and roles in the image of the group's conceptions even when these individuals disfavored them.”

When confirmation bias targets negative trait ascriptions, it can have ethically problematic SFP effects.

“To be sure, when it targets negative trait ascriptions (pernicious stereotypes, etc.), the bias can have ethically problematic SFP effects.”

Facilitating the alignment of social reality with social beliefs is one of the important adaptive features for which confirmation bias was selected that has so far been neglected.

“It only claims that facilitating the alignment of social reality with social beliefs (i.e., reality matching) is one of the important adaptive features for which the bias was selected that has so far been neglected.”

Confirmation bias was selected for promoting SFPs.

“Taken together, these considerations provide a basis for holding that confirmation bias was selected for promoting SFPs.”

Social beliefs, unlike beliefs about the nonsocial world, are able to and frequently do initiate SFPs contributing to evolutionary benefits.

“Importantly, these beliefs, unlike beliefs about the nonsocial world, are able to and frequently do initiate SFPs contributing to the outlined evolutionary benefits.”

It doesn't follow that because confirmation bias also affects beliefs that can't initiate SFPs that it could not have been selected for affecting beliefs that can and do initiate SFPs.

“Second, it doesn't follow that because confirmation bias also affects beliefs that can't initiate SFPs that it could not have been selected for affecting beliefs that can and do initiate SFPs.”

Confirmation bias enables a social 'ripple' effect in the process of making trait ascriptions match reality.

“As a general tendency to support any of one's beliefs rather than only favored ones, the bias thus enables a social 'ripple' effect in the process of making trait ascriptions match reality.”

SFPs of trait ascriptions occurred only when ascribers were certain of the ascriptions, not when they were less confident.

“For several studies found that SFPs of trait ascriptions occurred only when ascribers were certain of the ascriptions, not when they were less confident (Swann and Ely 1984;Pelham and Swann 1994;Swann 2012: 30).”

• cites Swann and Ely 1984 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Pelham and Swann 1994 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Swann 2012: 30 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Confirmation bias provides significant epistemic benefits in social cognition by helping us make social affairs match our beliefs about them even when we don't favor them.

“Thirdly, in helping us make social affairs match our beliefs about them even when we don't favor them, confirmation bias also provides us with significant epistemic benefits in social cognition.”

Assuming that confirmation bias operates on swift first impressions, the bias will frequently be adaptive in the ways mentioned.

“Assuming that confirmation bias operates on them nonetheless, the bias will frequently be adaptive in the ways just mentioned.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Confirmation bias operates on swift first impressions in everyday social interactions.

The more affected one is by confirmation bias, the higher the likelihood of SFPs of the ascriptions.

“Thus, the more affected you are by the bias, the higher the likelihood of SFPs of the ascriptions because conviction about the ascriptions plays a key facilitative role for SFPs.”

The more convinced one is about a trait ascription to A, the higher the normative impetus on A, as a cooperative subject, to conform so as to avoid disrupting interactions.

“and the higher the normative impetus on him, as a cooperative subject, to conform so as to avoid disrupting interactions with you.”

In ancestral 'tribal' groups, confirmation bias targeting negative trait ascriptions would perhaps still have contributed to social conformity, predictability, and sustaining the status quo, which would have been adaptive.

“But, as noted, especially in ancestral 'tribal' groups, it would perhaps still have contributed to social conformity, predictability, and sustaining the status quo, which would have been adaptive in these groups (Richerson and Boyd 2005) inter alia by facilitating social cognition.”

• cites Richerson and Boyd 2005Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Confirmation bias is more pronounced with respect to social beliefs compared to non-social beliefs.

“Finally, there is also evidence that confirmation bias is more pronounced with respect to social beliefs compared to non-social beliefs.”

• cites Marsh and Hanlon 2007 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Talaifar and Swann 2017 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Goodwin et al. 2000 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The more affected one is by confirmation bias, the lower the likelihood that one will reveal in one's behavior a lack of conviction about one's trait ascriptions that could undermine SFPs.

“and so the lower the likelihood that you will reveal in your behavior a lack of conviction about them that could undermine SFPs.”

Confirmation bias was selected for making us effective 'nodes' in social networks by inclining us to create social reality that corresponds to these networks' conceptions even when we dislike them or they are harmful to others.

“I suggest that confirmation bias too was selected for making us effective 'nodes' in social networks by inclining us to create social reality that corresponds to these networks' conceptions even when we dislike them or they are harmful to others (e.g., out-group members).”

In ancestral groups, selection pressure favored social conformity, predictability, and stability.

“For, as Richerson and Boyd (2005: 121f) note too, in ancestral groups, selection pressure favored social conformity, predictability, and stability.”

• cites Richerson and Boyd 2005: 121fNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Many biological features or cognitive traits were selected for fulfilling a certain function despite rarely doing so or even having maladaptive effects.

“The literature offers many examples of biological features or cognitive traits that were selected for fulfilling a certain function despite rarely doing so or even having maladaptive effects (Millikan 1984;Haselton and Nettle 2006).”

• cites Millikan 1984 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Haselton and Nettle 2006 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

If social beliefs are pervasive and SFPs of them significant for our flourishing, then a domain-general tendency to confirm any of our beliefs ensures that we don't miss opportunities to align social reality with our conceptions and to reap the related developmental and epistemic benefits.

“This matters because if social beliefs are pervasive and SFPs of them significant for our flourishing, then a domain-general tendency to confirm any of our beliefs ensures that we don't miss opportunities to align social reality with our conceptions and to reap the related developmental and epistemic benefits.”

A general confirmation bias can fulfil the function of facilitating SFPs more frequently than motivated cognitions, whenever the subject has acquired a social conception.

“This means that such a general tendency, i.e., a confirmation bias, can fulfil the function of facilitating SFPs more frequently than motivated cognitions, namely whenever the subject has acquired a social conception (e.g., as the result of upbringing, learning, or testimony).”

Confirmation bias might serve the 'collective' to bring subjects into accordance with its social conceptions (positive or negative).

“This coheres with the view that confirmation bias might serve the 'collective' to bring subjects into accordance with its social conceptions (positive or negative).”

One of the adaptive features for which confirmation bias evolved is that it helps us bring social reality into alignment with our beliefs.

“the reality-matching (RM) account, which holds that one of the adaptive features for which the bias evolved is that it helps us bring social reality into alignment with our beliefs.”

Confirmation bias would only lead to group-level benefits in groups with viewpoint diversity.

“and that confirmation bias would arguably only lead to the group-level benefits at issue in groups with viewpoint diversity.”

This condition is satisfied even in groups with viewpoint homogeneity.

“This condition is satisfied even in groups with viewpoint homogeneity.”

The resulting group polarization can be adaptive in strengthening the reality-matching process.

“And, as noted, the resulting group polarization itself can then be adaptive in strengthening the realitymatching process.”

The socially constructive aspect of confirmation bias highlighted here has so far been overlooked in evolutionary theorizing on confirmation bias.

“While the socially constructive aspect of confirmation bias highlighted here may not be the main or only feature of the bias that led to its evolution, it is one that has so far been overlooked in the evolutionary theorizing on confirmation bias.”

The RM account suggests that when directed at beliefs about social affairs, confirmation bias does often help subjects correct their mistaken conceptions to the extent that it contributes to SFPs of them.

“The RM account offers a different perspective, suggesting that when it is directed at beliefs about social affairs, confirmation bias does often help subjects correct their mistaken conceptions to the extent that it contributes to SFPs of them.”

The RM account has greater explanatory power than the three alternative views outlined above.

“First, it has greater explanatory power than the three alternative views outlined above.”

In contemporary societies, overall accumulative SFP effects of negative social beliefs (e.g., stereotypes) might be stronger than those of positive social beliefs in individual dyadic interactions.

“in contemporary societies, overall accumulative SFP effects of negative social beliefs capturing, e.g., stereotypes might be stronger than those of positive social beliefs in individual dyadic interactions(Madon et al. 2018).”

• cites Madon et al. 2018 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The more widespread a political conviction in a population, the higher the probability that the population will adopt political structures that shape reality in line with it.

“And the more widespread a political conviction in a population, the higher the probability that the population will adopt political structures that shape reality in line with it (Jost et al. 2003;Ordabayeva and Fernandes 2018).”

• cites Jost et al. 2003 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Ordabayeva and Fernandes 2018 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The intention-alignment view has a problem: confirmation bias seems to hinder intention alignment by weakening perspective-taking and inclining people to ignore or distort objections.

“One problem with this view was that the bias seems to hinder an intention alignment of individuals by weakening their perspective-taking capacity, and inclining them to ignore or distort people's objections.”

When it comes to ideological propositions in like-minded groups, confirmation bias is more pronounced.

“it is to be expected that when it comes to ideological propositions in like-minded groups, confirmation bias is more pronounced.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Subjects have a keen interest in reality corresponding to their ideological conceptions.

The RM account differs from the intention-alignment view, which holds that confirmation bias evolved for allowing us to synchronize intentions with others.

“The RM account also differs from the intention-alignment view, which holds that confirmation bias evolved for allowing us to synchronize intentions with others.”

Empirical data corroborate some predictions of the RM account.

“Empirical data thus corroborate some of the predictions of the RM account.”

Related empirical studies suggest that confirmation bias is particularly common and pronounced for social beliefs about oneself, other people, and social states of affairs subject can determine.

“In short, then, while there are currently no systematic comparative studies on whether confirmation bias is more frequent or stronger with respect to social beliefs, related empirical studies do suggest that when it comes to (positive or negative) social beliefs about oneself, other people, and social states of affairs that the subject can determine (e.g., political beliefs), confirmation bias is”

If bias functions to boost one's own conviction to facilitate SFPs, then laziness in critical thinking about one's own positions shouldn't be surprising.

“But if the bias functions to boost primarily only one's own conviction about particular beliefs so as to facilitate SFPs then 'laziness' in critical thinking about one's own positions (Trouche et al. 2016) shouldn't be surprising.”

• cites Trouche et al. 2016 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

If RM account, confirmation bias should be particularly strong for beliefs about political states of affairs.

“If, as the RM account proposes, confirmation bias was selected for sustaining social beliefs for the sake of reality matching then the bias should be particularly strong when it comes to beliefs about political states of affairs.”

SFPs can accumulate when they occur across different interactions.

“SFPs can also accumulate when they occur across different interactions”

• cites Madon et al. 2018 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Stronger, more extreme political attitudes correlate with higher interest in attitude-consistent vs attitude-discrepant political articles.

“Brannon et al. (2007) found that stronger, more extreme political attitudes are correlated with higher ratings of interest in attitude-consistent versus attitude-discrepant political articles.”

• cites Brannon et al. 2007 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source