The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Killer Acquisitions
Abstract
This paper argues that incumbent firms may acquire innovative targets solely to discontinue the target’s innovation projects and preempt future competition. We call such acquisitions “killer acquisitions.” We develop a model illustrating this phenomenon. Using pharmaceutical industry data, we show that acquired drug projects are less likely to be developed when they overlap with the acquirer’s existing product portfolio, especially when the acquirer’s market power is large because of weak competition or distant patent expiration. Conservative estimates indicate that 5.3%–7.4% of acquisitions in our sample are killer acquisitions. These acquisitions disproportionately occur just below thresholds for antitrust scrutiny.
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Cites
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Cragg, J. G., & Zarembka, P. (1975) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/134075 · Cited by 8,342
Teece, D. J. (1986) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/0048-7333(86)90027-2 · Cited by 7,842
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261729 · Cited by 5,364
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
Roll, R. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296325 · Cited by 3,751
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05079.x · Cited by 1,887
Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of Research Productivity in Drug Discovery
Henderson, R., & Cockburn, I. (1996) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555791 · Cited by 1,388
Salant, S. W., Switzer, S., & Reynolds, R. J. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885620 · Cited by 1,331
Free Entry and Social Inefficiency
Mankiw, N. G., & Whinston, M. D. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555627 · Cited by 1,233
Cited by
Edmans, A. (2023) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/fima.12413 · Cited by 531
Innovating big tech firms and competition policy: favoring dynamic over static competition
Petit, N., & Teece, D. J. (2021) · Industrial and Corporate Change · doi:10.1093/icc/dtab049 · Cited by 109
Mandated Financial Reporting and Corporate Innovation
Breuer, M., Leuz, C., & Vanhaverbeke, S. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3449813 · Cited by 27
Edmans, A. (2022) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4221990 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Cunningham, C., Ederer, F., & Ma, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2021-03-01
- Volume
- 129
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 649-702
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W4231991048
- Cited by
- 452
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 39.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.