The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Personalized Pricing and Consumer Welfare
Open accessAbstract
We study the welfare implications of personalized pricing implemented with machine learning. We use data from a randomized controlled pricing field experiment to construct personalized prices and validate these in the field. We find that unexercised market power increases profit by 55%. Personalization improves expected profits by an additional 19% and by 86% relative to the nonoptimized price. While total consumer surplus declines under personalized pricing, over 60% of consumers benefit from personalization. Under some inequity-averse welfare functions, consumer welfare may even increase. Simulations reveal a nonmonotonic relationship between the granularity of data and consumer surplus under personalization.
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Citations
Cites
The adaptive lasso and its oracle properties
Zou, H. (2006) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1198/016214506000000735 · Cited by 7,470
On the measurement of inequality
Atkinson, A. B. (1970) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(70)90039-6 · Cited by 6,550 · cited 10×
“Under alternative inequality-averse consumer welfare functions (Lewbel and Pendakur, 2017; Atkinson, 1970; Jorgenson, 1990), we nd that these redistributive bene ts could outweigh the losses in total consumer surplus depending on the degree of the social planner's inequality aversion. Although our experiments are not…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 · Cited by 3,306 · cited 1×
“This paper was edited by Chad Syverson. personalized pricing and consumer welfare 133 of differentiated substitute products (e.g., Mussa and Rosen 1978).”
BackgroundRecursive partitioning for heterogeneous causal effects
Athey, S., & Imbens, G. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1510489113 · Cited by 1,586
The Value of Purchase History Data in Target Marketing
Rossi, P. E., McCulloch, R. E., & Allenby, G. M. (1996) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.15.4.321 · Cited by 754
One Swallow Doesn't Make a Summer: New Evidence on Anchoring Effects
Maniadis, Z., Tufano, F., & List, J. A. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.1.277 · Cited by 280
Cited by
Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market
Assad, S., Clark, R., Ershov, D., & Xu, L. (2024) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/726906 · Cited by 261
Puntoni, S., & Wertenbroch, K. (2024) · Journal of the Association for Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/730788 · Cited by 17
Sanders, R. E. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2994426 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Dubé, J.-P., & Misra, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2023-01-01
- Volume
- 131
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 131-189
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W4280549099
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 23.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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