AMAZING GRACE: TAX AMNESTIES AND COMPLIANCE
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Does a tax amnesty raise or lower compliance over time? This paper uses experimental methods to analyze the long run impact of an amnesty. The results indicate that the average level of compliance falls after an amnesty. However, a well-designed amnesty may be able to overcome this decline. If post-amnesty enforcement efforts increase, then aggregate compliance actually increases. In fact, post-amnesty compliance is higher when an amnesty is accompanied by increased enforcement efforts than when enforcement increases without an amnesty. An amnesty may therefore be an effective tool for easing the transition to a tougher tax regime.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Practical Nonparametric Statistics
Groggel, D. J. (2000) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.2000.10486067 · Cited by 11,041
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
Samuelson, P. A. (1954) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925895 · Cited by 7,458
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
Mark Isaac, R., McCue, K. F., & Plott, C. R. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90038-6 · Cited by 593
FISCAL INEQUITY AND TAX EVASION: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
Spicer, M. W., & BECKER, L. A. (1980) · National Tax Journal · doi:10.1086/ntj41862299 · Cited by 464
Witte, A. D., & WOODBURY, D. F. (1985) · National Tax Journal · doi:10.1086/ntj41791992 · Cited by 462
A simulation study of income tax evasion
Friedland, N., Maital, S., & Rutenberg, A. (1978) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(78)90008-7 · Cited by 387
Organizing Groups for Collective Action
Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., Simmons, R. T., & Van De Kragt, A. J. C. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400185053 · Cited by 335
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX AUDITING AND COMPLIANCE
DUBIN, J. A., & WILDE, L. L. (1988) · National Tax Journal · doi:10.1086/ntj41788709 · Cited by 245
Dimensions of parallelism: some policy applications of experimental methods
Plott, C. R. (1987) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528316.007 · Cited by 169
Cited by
The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour
Kirchler, E., & Braithwaite, V. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511628238 · Cited by 1,206
Metadata
- Authors
- ALM, J., McKEE, M., & BECK, W.
- Venue
- National Tax Journal
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-03-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-37
- ISSN
- 0028-0283 (ISSN-L)
- 1944-7477
- OpenAlex
- W302555743
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 6.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: AMAZING GRACE: TAX AMNESTIES AND COMPLIANCE. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/ntj41788822
- The paper
- ALM, J., McKEE, M., & BECK, W. (1990). AMAZING GRACE: TAX AMNESTIES AND COMPLIANCE. National Tax Journal. https://doi.org/10.1086/ntj41788822
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.