The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN MEASURING AND INTERPRETING TAXABLE INCOME ELASTICITIES
Abstract
Because the response of taxable income to the income tax rate captures all of the responses to taxation, it holds the promise of more accurately summarizing the marginal efficiency cost of taxation than a narrower measure of taxpayer response such as the labor supply elasticity. The promise does, though, come with problems and caveats. This paper reviews the key issues in empirically measuring the taxable income elasticity and in using it to evaluate tax reform. I stress the idea that the taxable income elasticity is a matter of government policy, rather than an immutable parameter, and note the importance of looking for revenue offsets in other tax bases and other time periods.
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In the citing paper
“However, in many instances the reduction in reported incomes is due in part to a shift away from individual income toward other forms of taxable income such as corporate income, or deferred compensation that will be taxable to the individual at a later date (see Slemrod, 1998).”
From The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review (2009) · cites this paper as Slemrod, 1998
In the citing paper
“The empirical literature on the taxable income elasticity has generally found that elasticities are large 10.5 to 1.52 for individuals in the top percentile of the income distribution, and relatively small 10 to 0.32 for the rest of the income distribution 1see e.g., Lawrence B. Lindsey 1987; Joel Slemrod 1998; Jon Gruber and Emmanuel Saez 2002; Saez 20042.”
From Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance (2009) · cites this paper as Slemrod 1998
In the citing paper
“An alternative approach is to compare the mechanical change in total tax revenue 1from all tax bases2 with the actual change in total tax revenue 1Auerbach 1985; Slemrod 19982:”
From Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance (2009) · cites this paper as Slemrod 1998
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Citations
Cites
Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax
Feldstein, M. (1999) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465399558391 · Cited by 816
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- 1998, Department of Treasury
- Burman Leonard, 1994, National Tax Journal, 45, 1, 10.1086/NTJ41789050 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review
Saez, E., Slemrod, J., & Giertz, S. H. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.1.3 · Cited by 1,299
Self-citationCheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion
Slemrod, J. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.1.25 · Cited by 1,168
Self-citationThe elasticity of taxable income: evidence and implications
Gruber, J., & Saez, E. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00085-8 · Cited by 990
Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration
Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7473 · Cited by 843
Self-citationThe Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice
Murphy, L., & Nagel, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0195150163.001.0001 · Cited by 768
Metadata
- Authors
- SLEMROD, J.
- Venue
- National Tax Journal
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1998-12-01
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 773-788
- ISSN
- 0028-0283 (ISSN-L)
- 1944-7477
- OpenAlex
- W1532684042
- Cited by
- 181
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 14.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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