The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography
Open accessAbstract
A quantum key distribution (QKD) system may be probed by an eavesdropper Eve by sending in bright light from the quantum channel and analyzing the back-reflections. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a setup for mounting such a Trojan-horse attack. We show it in operation against the quantum cryptosystem Clavis2 from ID Quantique, as a proof-of-principle. With just a few back-reflected photons, Eve discerns Bobʼs (secret) basis choice, and thus the raw key bit in the Scarani–Acín–Ribordy–Gisin 2004 protocol, with higher than 90% probability. This would clearly breach the security of the cryptosystem. Unfortunately, Eveʼs bright pulses have a side effect of causing a high level of afterpulsing in Bobʼs single-photon detectors, resulting in a large quantum bit error rate that effectively protects this system from our attack. However, in a Clavis2-like system equipped with detectors with less-noisy but realistic characteristics, an attack strategy with positive leakage of the key would exist. We confirm this by a numerical simulation. Both the eavesdropping setup and strategy can be generalized to attack most of the current QKD systems, especially if they lack proper safeguards. We also propose countermeasures to prevent such attacks.
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Cites
Gisin, N., Ribordy, G., Tittel, W., & Zbinden, H. (2002) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.74.145 · Cited by 8,515
Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing
Bennett, C. H., & Brassard, G. (2014) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2014.05.025 · Cited by 8,299
Saleh, B. E. A., & Teich, M. C. (1991) · doi:10.1002/0471213748 · Cited by 3,383
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Practical challenges in quantum key distribution
Diamanti, E., Lo, H.-K., Qi, B., & Yuan, Z. (2016) · npj Quantum Information · doi:10.1038/npjqi.2016.25 · Cited by 737
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Cao, Y., Zhao, Y., Wang, Q., Zhang, J., Ng, S. X., & Hanzo, L. (2022) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2022.3144219 · Cited by 505
Quantum computing: A taxonomy, systematic review and future directions
Gill, S. S., Kumar, A., Singh, H., Singh, M., Kaur, K., Usman, M., & Buyya, R. (2022) · Software: Practice and Experience · doi:10.1002/spe.3039 · Cited by 476
Gehring, T., Händchen, V., Duhme, J., Furrer, F., Franz, T., Pacher, C., Werner, R. F., & Schnabel, R. (2015) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms9795 · Cited by 291
Metadata
- Authors
- Jain, N., Anisimova, E., Khan, I., Makarov, V., Marquardt, C., & Leuchs, G.
- Venue
- New Journal of Physics
- Publisher
- IOP Publishing
- Published
- 2014-12-10
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 123030
- ISSN
- 1367-2630 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2140192101
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 10.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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