Cited by 372Philosophical Ethics and TheoryFeminism, Gender, and IntersectionalityFeminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles

Tessman, Lisa·2005

Abstract

Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.

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Crossref · 10.1093/0195179145.001.0001

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  • Aristotelian conceptions of flourishing have tended to exclude members of marginalized groups who may need to develop specific virtues such as defiance or anger to resist their unjust situation, leading to pathologisation of virtues made necessary by social context.

    “On the one hand, Aristotleian conceptions of flourishing have tended to exclude members of marginalized groups who may need to develop specific virtues such as defiance or anger in order to resist their unjust situation, leading to the pathologisation of the very virtues made necessary by the social context (Potter, 2016;Tessman, 2005).”

    From Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life (2022) · cites this paper as Tessman, 2005

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Authors
Tessman, L.
Affiliations
Binghamton University (US)
Corresponding author
Tessman, Lisa
Published
2005-10-01
OpenAlex
W4252133580
Cited by
372
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 53 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 4
FWCI
13.31
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminism, Gender, and Intersectionality
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
Keywords
virtue ethics, Aristotelian ethics, feminist ethics, oppression, moral damages, moral costs, eudaimonia, resistance to oppression

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