The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
Abstract
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.
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Cites
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 · Cited by 4,022
Self-citationKnowledge and the Flow of Information.
Alston, W. P., & Dretske, F. I. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184492 · Cited by 3,286
Mezei, A., & Paivio, A. (1972) · Leonardo · doi:10.2307/1572599 · Cited by 3,246
The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems
Boring, E. G., & Gibson, J. J. (1967) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1420561 · Cited by 3,157
Retrieval time from semantic memory
Collins, A. M., & Quillian, M. R. (1969) · Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0022-5371(69)80069-1 · Cited by 3,109
The role of theories in conceptual coherence.
Murphy, G. L., & Medin, D. L. (1985) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.92.3.289 · Cited by 2,792
Language Acquisition: The State of the Art
Wanner, E., & Gleitman, L. R. (2009) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 2,022
An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
Hume, D. (2008) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/owc/9780199549900.001.0001 · Cited by 1,774
Language Learnability and Language Development
Pye, C., & Pinker, S. (1985) · Language · doi:10.2307/414499 · Cited by 1,665
Learnability and Cognition: The Acquisition of Argument Structure
Pinker, S. (2013) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9700.001.0001 · Cited by 1,452
Cited by
Keil, F. C. (2006) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190100 · Cited by 1,350
Burge, T. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199581405.001.0001 · Cited by 1,075
Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. P. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0198236107.001.0001 · Cited by 773
Morphology and Lexical Semantics
Lieber, R. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511486296 · Cited by 727
LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited
Fodor, J. A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.001.0001 · Cited by 590
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fodor, J. A.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1998-02-05
- OpenAlex
- W4253689767
- Cited by
- 1,274
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 32.38
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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