The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge
Abstract
In this chapter, a set of replies to Richard Rorty's then‐pragmatist criticisms, Davidson defends a coherence theory of truth that is not incompatible but in fact yields a correspondence theory. He argues that the common ground for the theories are considerations of meaning and the objective truth‐conditions that state when meanings are given. Coherence, then, is supposed to be a test for both truth and the judgement that objective truth‐conditions are justified, yielding what Davidson calls a ‘non‐confrontational’ correspondence and a realist stance in all departments involved.
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Cites
Ambrose, A., Wittgenstein, L., & Anscombe, G. E. M. (1954) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2103745 · Cited by 12,192
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246270.001.0001 · Cited by 6,119
Self-citationMinnesota studies in the philosophy of science
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Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246297.001.0001 · Cited by 4,215
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Kivunja, C., & Kuyini, A. B. (2017) · International Journal of Higher Education · doi:10.5430/ijhe.v6n5p26 · Cited by 1,216
Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography
Macarthur, D., & Malpas, J. E. (2001) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/3182610 · Cited by 462
Epistemic Pluralism, Epistemic Relativism and ‘Hinge’ Epistemology
Adam Carter, J. (2017) · Epistemic Pluralism · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_9 · Cited by 24
Metadata
- Authors
- Davidson, D.
- Venue
- Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2001-09-27
- Pages
- 137-158
- OpenAlex
- W205727057
- Cited by
- 658
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 286.71
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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