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The Nature of Necessity
Abstract
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.
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Citations
Cited by
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Short, T. L. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498350 · Cited by 675
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Widerker, D. (1995) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185979 · Cited by 357
Darwinian Metaphysics: Species And The Question Of Essentialism
Okasha, S. (2002) · Synthese · doi:10.1023/a:1015731831011 · Cited by 339
Metadata
- Authors
- Plantinga, A.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1978-02-01
- OpenAlex
- W2981298342
- Cited by
- 843
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.84
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Plantinga, A. (1978). The Nature of Necessity. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244142.001.0001
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