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Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point
Abstract
By distinguishing between two different levels of moral thinking, we see how utilitarian reasoning at the critical level—enlisting the impartial sympathy for others’ predicaments, which we must have if we fully understand them and universalize our preferences as morality requires—generates moral principles for use at the intuitive level, which square with common intuitions, e.g. about justice and rights. The reasoning itself depends on the logic of concepts, which all who ask moral questions are already using.
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Cited by
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Sen, A., & Foster, J. (1973) · doi:10.1093/0198281935.001.0001 · Cited by 3,429
Foot, P. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0198235089.001.0001 · Cited by 1,356
Moral Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength or Something More?
Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Sargis, E. G. (2005) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.6.895 · Cited by 828
Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000093 · Cited by 434
Metadata
- Authors
- Hare, R. M.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1981-12-17
- OpenAlex
- W4240827200
- Cited by
- 1,904
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 24.12
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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