The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Naturalism in Mathematics
Abstract
It is well known that certain natural statements of set theory, like Cantor's continuum hypothesis (CH), cannot be proved or disproved on the basis of the standard axioms (Zermelo–Fraenkel with Choice or ZFC). Some philosophers take this to be the end of the story on these questions, but set theorists continue to look for answers by investigating candidates for new axioms. One way to understand this work, an approach pioneered by Gödel, is to embrace some brand of realism (sometimes called ‘Platonism’) about sets: there is an objective world of sets in which the CH is either true or false; ZFC does not completely describe this world; our job is to find new true axioms that will give a fuller description detailed enough to decide the CH. Recent versions of realism in the philosophy of mathematics have rested on Quine's indispensability arguments: the world posited by our best scientific theories includes mathematical entities. In this book, I argue that attention to the actual details of scientific methodology substantially undermines Quine's argument, leaving realism without its best support. As an alternative, I develop a naturalistic approach (drawing on other themes from Quine, Gödel, and Wittgenstein) that finds the justification for mathematical methods in mathematics rather than extra‐mathematical philosophy, and I apply this naturalism to the test case of a particular new axiom candidate (Gödel's Axiom of Constructibility).
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Cites
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science
Hacking, I. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814563 · Cited by 4,814
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A Mathematical Introduction to Logic
(2001) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/c2009-0-22107-6 · Cited by 2,387
Farber, M., & Ayer, A. J. (1938) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2180985 · Cited by 2,113
Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays
Ramsey, F. P. (2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315887814 · Cited by 1,994
Williams, C. J. F. (1979) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1979.tb01788.x · Cited by 1,906
Set Theory An Introduction to Independence Proofs
(1980) · Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics · doi:10.1016/s0049-237x(08)x7037-5 · Cited by 1,514
Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist
Synge, J. L. (1950) · The Journal of Higher Education · doi:10.1080/00221546.1950.11776081 · Cited by 1,349
Nature's capacities and their measurement
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-4463 · Cited by 1,342
Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times
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Metadata
- Authors
- Maddy, P.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2000-06-29
- OpenAlex
- W1589950552
- Cited by
- 374
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 14.23
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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