The Scientific Image
Abstract
This book presents an empiricist alternative (‘constructive empiricism’) to both logical positivism and scientific realism. Against the former, it insists on a literal understanding of the language of science and on an irreducibly pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. Against scientific realism, it insists that the central aim of science is empirical adequacy (‘saving the phenomena’) and that even unqualified acceptance of a theory involves no more belief than that this goal is met. Beginning with a critique of the metaphysical arguments that typically accompany scientific realism, a new characterization of empirical adequacy is presented, together with an interpretation of probability in both modern and contemporary physics and a pragmatic theory of explanation.
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An empiricist could argue along Read's functionalist lines and conclude that pseudotensors are physical quantities describing properties of an unobservable entity, gravitational energy and momentum.
“For also the empiricist, e.g. van Fraassen (1980), could argue along Read's functionalist lines, and conclude that pseudotensors are physical quantities, which describe properties of some entities in the world-in this case, an unobservable entity, viz. gravitational energy and momentum.”
From Noether's Theorems and Energy in General Relativity (2021) · cites this paper as van Fraassen (1980)
According to van Fraassen's scientific empiricism, our interpretation of any graph will be limited by the ability of our measures to distinguish between different configurations, so we can only describe a graph through the number of metrics we invent to classify it.
“According to van Fraassen's scientific empiricism (1980, pages 76 ^91) our interpretation of any graph will be limited by the ability of our measures to distinguish between different configurations, so we can only describe a graph through the number of metrics we invent to classify it.”
From From Isovists to Visibility Graphs: A Methodology for the Analysis of Architectural Space (2001) · cites this paper as van Fraassen, 1980
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- Authors
- Fraassen, B. C. V.
- Corresponding author
- Fraassen, Bas. C. van
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1980-12-11
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 366
- OpenAlex
- W4210828651
- Cited by
- 4,682
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 217 · 2025: 302 · 2024: 140 · 2023: 163 · 2022: 124 · 2021: 195 · 2020: 190 · 2019: 275 · 2018: 138 · 2017: 135 · 2016: 143 · 2015: 113 · 2014: 109 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 123
- FWCI
- 55.77
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Linear Collider (submittedVersion)
- DIAL (Catholic University of Leuven) (submittedVersion)
- DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) (submittedVersion)
- Mind
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- constructive empiricism, scientific realism, logical positivism, empirical adequacy, theory acceptance, pragmatism, probability interpretation, philosophy of physics, theory of explanation, metaphysics of science
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