The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Knowledge and its Place in Nature
Abstract
Argues that conceptual analysis should be rejected in favour of a more naturalistic approach to epistemology. There is a robust natural phenomenon of knowledge; knowledge is a natural kind. An examination of the cognitive ethology literature reveals a category of knowledge that does both causal and explanatory work. It is argued that knowledge in this very sense is what philosophers have been talking about all along. Rival accounts of knowledge that are more demanding—requiring either that certain social conditions be met or that an agent engage in some sort of reflection—are discussed in detail, and it is argued that they are inadequate to the phenomenon. In addition, it is argued that the account of knowledge that emerges from the cognitive ethology literature can provide an explanation of the normative force of epistemic claims.
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Cites
Ambrose, A., Wittgenstein, L., & Anscombe, G. E. M. (1954) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2103745 · Cited by 12,192
Exaptation—a missing term in the science of form
Gould, S. J., & Vrba, E. S. (1982) · Paleobiology · doi:10.1017/s0094837300004310 · Cited by 5,136
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.2098 · Cited by 4,583
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246297.001.0001 · Cited by 4,215
Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.002 · Cited by 3,643
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593
Making it explicit : reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment
Brandom, R. B. (1994) · Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association · Cited by 2,620
How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226218526.001.0001 · Cited by 2,268
Science, Perception and Reality
Burrell, D. B., & Philosophical Studies, W. S. F. T. N. U. O. I. (1964) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.5840/philstudies196413091 · Cited by 2,215
Cited by
Expanding the Dimensions of Epistemic Cognition: Arguments From Philosophy and Psychology
CHINN, C. A., BUCKLAND, L. A., & SAMARAPUNGAVAN, A. (2011) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.587722 · Cited by 524
Kornblith, H. (2016) · The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.8 · Cited by 331
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kornblith, H.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2002-08-01
- OpenAlex
- W1591428544
- Cited by
- 931
- References
- 68
- FWCI
- 20.47
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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