The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Philosophical Naturalism
Abstract
This article focuses on naturalistic approaches to philosophical methodology. It begins with an overview of naturalism, its relationship with views about the a priori, and the implications of a philosopher’s commitment to naturalism for proper method in philosophy. It then considers the disagreement among naturalists about the tenability of the a priori/a posteriori distinction with respect to naturalism, before turning to a discussion of the use of science to address philosophical questions. It also looks at work in epistemology which draws on results in the cognitive sciences as a way of understanding the nature of knowledge, with particular emphasis on the role of Alvin Goldman in getting epistemologists to pay attention to the import of empirical work for understanding epistemological issues. Finally, it explores experimental philosophy as a methodological approach to philosophical questions and comments on the debate over the legitimacy of armchair methods in philosophy.
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Cites
Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason
Simon, H. A. (1997) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4711.001.0001 · Cited by 4,205
Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.002 · Cited by 3,643
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.
Connolly, T., Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1981) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392481 · Cited by 2,632
Science, Perception and Reality
Burrell, D. B., & Philosophical Studies, W. S. F. T. N. U. O. I. (1964) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.5840/philstudies196413091 · Cited by 2,215
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Psychophysical and theoretical identifications
Lewis, D. (1972) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048407212341301 · Cited by 1,580
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
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From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis
(1999) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.36-3262 · Cited by 1,469
Cited by
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis
Jackson, F. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0198250614.001.0001 · Cited by 560
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind
Rupert, R. D. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.001.0001 · Cited by 411
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
Balog, K. (1999) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998286 · Cited by 242
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Kornblith, H.
- Venue
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2016-08-03
- Pages
- 147-158
- OpenAlex
- W4234084492
- Cited by
- 331
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 298.70
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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