The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Perception and Reason
Open accessAbstract
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs about particular objects in the world at all. So there are epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experience lies in its essential contribution to the subject's understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. I explain in detail how this is so; defend my position against a wide range of objections; compare and contrast it with a number of influential alternative views in the area; and bring out its connection with Russell's Principle of Acquaintance, and its consequences for the compatibility of content externalism with an adequate account of self‐knowledge.
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Cites
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers
(1975) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251 · Cited by 3,918
Reference and Definite Descriptions
Donnellan, K. S. (1966) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183143 · Cited by 2,505
Strawson, P. F. (2002) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203221303 · Cited by 2,127
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Goldman, A. I. (1976) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025679 · Cited by 1,870
McDowell, J., & The Hegeler Institute (1979) · Monist · doi:10.5840/monist197962319 · Cited by 1,470
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Gettier, E. L. (1963) · Analysis · doi:10.2307/3326922 · Cited by 1,268
Dretske, F. I. (1970) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024710 · Cited by 1,022
Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology
Sosa, E. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625299 · Cited by 1,002
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?
McDowell, J., & McFetridge, I. G. (1978) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/52.1.13 · Cited by 921
Cited by
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Pryor, J. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x · Cited by 705
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Littlejohn, C. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139060097 · Cited by 530
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action
Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2014) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00604.x · Cited by 270
Metadata
- Authors
- Brewer, B.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2002-03-07
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 449-449
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2112479272
- Cited by
- 269
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 47.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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