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Cited by 134Philosophical Ethics and TheoryWar, Ethics, and JustificationPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Double-Effect Reasoning

Cavanaugh, T. A.·2006·Oxford University Press eBooks
DOI 10.1093/0199272190.001.0001
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Abstract

Consequentialists oppose while absolutists and deontologists rely upon double-effect reasoning (DER) to address hard cases in which good inextricably binds with evil (such as destroying a legitimate military target while concomitantly and foreseeably killing innocents). This book addresses the history, application, and philosophical controversy concerning DER. It traces both the origin of DER in the thought of Aquinas and its development by subsequent ethicists. Considering consequentialist criticisms, proportionalism, and recent revisions of double effect, the book argues at length for the reasonableness of DER, particularly the intended/foreseen distinction. Intent is distinguished from foresight, and this distinction is applied to the classic cases of terror and tactical bombing. Most importantly, the book establishes the ethical relevance of this distinction, grounding its import both in broadly Aristotelian-Thomistic features of action as voluntary, and in a Kantian focus on the victim as an end in himself. The book also considers typically neglected albeit intriguing issues such as DER’s application to allowings and how constitutional legal systems that incorporate exceptionless norms employ a legal analogue to DER.

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  • Stevenson and Peck offered modified criteria for evaluating social media actions based on Cavanaugh's original criteria.

    “On the basis of Cavanaugh's original criteria, 54 Stevenson and Peck 53 offer modified criteria for evaluating social media actions (Figure 2).”

    From Social Media and Clinical Care: Ethical, Professional, and Social Implications (2013) · cites this paper as [54]

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Authors
Cavanaugh, T. A.
Corresponding author
Cavanaugh, T. A.
Venue
Oxford University Press eBooks
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Published
2006-08-01
DOI
10.1093/0199272190.001.0001
OpenAlex
W2490840936
Cited by
134
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 4
FWCI
4.08
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › War, Ethics, and Justification
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
double effect, Thomas Aquinas, consequentialism, deontology, proportionalism, military ethics, terrorism, voluntary action, Kantian ethics, end in itself, constitutional law

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