Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious?
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Abstract
Abstract Do birds have feelings? What about fish—can fish feel pain? Do insects have experiences? Can a honeybee feel anxious? If trees are not conscious but fish are, what is the objective difference between them that results in this? How do we decide which living creatures have experiences and which ones are zombies—seemingly intelligent beings that lack experiences? Can there be a conscious robot? This book looks into the underlying analytical issues and the relevant scientific research on animal cognition to find philosophically rigorous, empirically informed answers to these questions. In order to do this, an epistemological framework suitable for tackling such issues is developed and then, in light of recent empirical research, applied broadly. In particular, the book argues that is rational to prefer the hypothesis that consciousness extends a considerable way down the phylogenetic scale––farther than many would expect. This result has both theoretical implications and practical ones for how should behave toward other animals.
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Citations
Cited by
Animal sentience and the precautionary principle
Birch, J. (2017) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1200 · Cited by 374
“…indicative of pain: the best explanation for the self-delivery of analgesics, motivational trade-offs and conditioned place avoidance involves postulating pain experiences; and this provides a reason, albeit not a conclusive reason, in favour of the hypothesis that pain is experienced (Tye 2016).”
The search for invertebrate consciousness
Birch, J. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12351 · Cited by 254
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198
Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization
Michel, M. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1133-4 · Cited by 51
“For the sake of argument, I will grant that in the absence of defeaters it just seems like the most rational thing to do (Tye (2017)).”
BackgroundBrains, Behaviour, and Cognition: Multiple Misconceptions
Font, E., Burghardt, G. M., & Leal, M. (2023) · Health and Welfare of Captive Reptiles · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-86012-7_7 · Cited by 24
Metadata
- Authors
- Tye, M.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2017-01-26
- OpenAlex
- W4244147241
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 2.98
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Tye, M. (2017). Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious? Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780190278014.001.0001
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