Cited by 51Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization

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Michel, Matthias·2019·Philosophical Studies

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Crossref · 10.1007/s11098-018-1133-4

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  • Michel (2019) reaches a pessimistic conclusion about our ability to ever agree on indicators for consciousness.

    “This problem is also raised by Michel (2019), who reaches a pessimistic conclusion about our ability to ever agree on indicators for consciousness.”

    From The Measurement Problem of Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as Michel (2019)

    In §2.2, Michel argues that proponents of multiple realization cannot establish a criterion for distinguishing plausible from implausible attributions of consciousness. The Conclusion says this debate cannot be settled by data alone, but also allows that sufficient conditions for consciousness in animals may be found. The claim captures his pessimism about a particular kind of criterion, but overstates it as an inability to ever agree on any indicators for consciousness. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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4 of the 116 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 15

  1. Allen, C. (2004). Animal Pain. Noûs, 38(4):617-643.
  2. Baars, B. J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Con- sciousness. Cambridge University Press.
  3. Bentham, J. (1789). Introduction to the prin- ciples of morals and legislation. Oxford: Clarendon.
  4. Beukema, J. J. (1969). Angling Experiments With Carp. Netherlands Journal of Zoology, 20(1):81-92.
  5. Chalmers, D. (2000). What is a Neural Cor- relate of Consciousness ? In Metzinger, T., editor, Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Issues, pages 1- 33. MIT Press.
  6. Dehaene, S. and Changeux, J. P. (2011). Exper- imental and Theoretical Approaches to Con- scious Processing. Neuron, 70(2):200-227.
  7. Dehaene, S. and Naccache, L. (2001). To- wards a cognitive neuroscience of conscious- ness: basic evidence and a workspace frame- work. Cognition, 79(1):1-37.
  8. Gillett, C. (2003). The metaphysics of real- ization, multiple realizability, and the spe- cial sciences. The Journal of Philosophy, 100(11):591-603.
  9. Hohwy, J. (2009). The neural correlates of con- sciousness : New experimental approaches needed ? Consciousness and Cognition, 18(2):428-438.
  10. Levin, J. (2017). Functionalism. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos- ophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, winter 2017 edition.
  11. Merker, B. (2008). Life expectancy in hydra- nencephaly. Clinical Neurology and Neuro- surgery, 110(3):213-214.
  12. Rollin, B. (1989). The unheeded cry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  13. Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color, and con- tent. MIT Press.
  14. Weiskrantz, L. (2009). Blindsight: a case study spanning 35 years and new developments. Oxford University Press, 2nd edition edition.
  15. Wilson, R. A. and Craver, C. F. (2006). Real- ization: Metaphysical and Scientific Perspec- tives. In Thagard, P., editor, Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Sci- ence, pages 81-104. Elsevier.

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Authors
Michel, M.
Affiliations
Sorbonne Université (FR)
Corresponding author
Michel, Matthias
Venue
Philosophical Studies
Published
2018-07-05
Volume
176
Issue
9
Pages
2411-2428
ISSN
  • 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0883
OpenAlex
W2832937512
Cited by
51
References
116
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 2
FWCI
3.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
fish pain, animal consciousness, multiple realizability, neocortex, animal sentience, fish cognition

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