How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter defines the concepts of natural sampling, natural frequencies, and reports experimental evidence for the impact of various external representations on statistical thinking. The mental strategies or shortcuts people use, not only their numerical estimates of risks, turn out to be a function of the external representation of numbers we choose. This chapter provides a theoretical framework that specifies why frequency formats should improve Bayesian reasoning and presents two studies that test whether they do. Its goal is to lead research on Bayesian inference out of the present conceptual cul-de-sac and to shift the focus from human errors to human engineering: how to help people reason the Bayesian way without even teaching them.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity
McCulloch, W. S., & Pitts, W. (1943) · The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics · doi:10.1007/bf02478259 · Cited by 18,566
I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE
TURING, A. M. (1950) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/lix.236.433 · Cited by 10,290
Rational choice and the structure of the environment.
Simon, H. A. (1956) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0042769 · Cited by 5,919
Exaptation—a missing term in the science of form
Gould, S. J., & Vrba, E. S. (1982) · Paleobiology · doi:10.1017/s0094837300004310 · Cited by 5,136
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science
Hacking, I. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814563 · Cited by 4,814
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
Plans and the structure of behavior.
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. (1960) · doi:10.1037/10039-000 · Cited by 4,630
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Neural Networks and the Bias/Variance Dilemma
Geman, S., Bienenstock, E., & Doursat, R. (1992) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco.1992.4.1.1 · Cited by 3,578
Cited by
Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing
(2001) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00379 · Cited by 2,357
Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.1.75 · Cited by 1,352
“However, outside of experimental designs—when data are obtained by natural sampling rather than systematic sampling (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995)—missing knowledge can be used to make intelligent inferences.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Paranoid Optimist: An Integrative Evolutionary Model of Cognitive Biases
Haselton, M. G., & Nettle, D. (2006) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1001_3 · Cited by 838
The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2006) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03193858 · Cited by 643
Language Acquisition as Rational Contingency Learning
Ellis, N. C. (2006) · Applied Linguistics · doi:10.1093/applin/ami038 · Cited by 559
Metadata
- Authors
- Gigerenzer, G.
- Venue
- Adaptive Thinking
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2002-03-28
- Pages
- 92-124
- OpenAlex
- W2482774336
- Cited by
- 63
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 5.42
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195153729.003.0006
- The paper
- Gigerenzer, G. (2002). How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction. Adaptive Thinking. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780195153729.003.0006
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.