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Moral, Believing Animals

Smith, Christian·2003·Oxford University Press eBooks

Abstract

What kind of animals are human beings? And how do our visions of the human shape our theories of social action and institutions? This book offers answers to these and other fundamental questions in sociological, cultural, and religious theories. The research for this book is based on the assumption (unfashionable in certain circles) that human beings have an identifiable and peculiar set of capacities and proclivities that distinguishes them significantly from other animals on this planet. It argues that all people are at bottom believers, whose lives, actions, and institutions are constituted, motivated, and governed by narrative traditions and moral orders on which they inescapably depend. Despite the vast differences in humanity between cultures and across history, no matter how differently people narrate their lives and histories, there remains an underlying structure of human personhood that helps to order human culture, history, and narration. Drawing on recent insights in moral philosophy, epistemology, and narrative studies, the book argues that humans are animals who have an inescapable moral and spiritual dimension. They cannot avoid a fundamental moral orientation in life and this, the book says, has profound consequences for how sociology must study human beings.

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Metadata

Authors
Smith, C.
Venue
Oxford University Press eBooks
Published
2003-07-10
OpenAlex
W2488063058
Cited by
359
References
0
FWCI
3.87
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Moral, Believing Animals. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195162028.001.0001
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Smith, C. (2003). Moral, Believing Animals. Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780195162028.001.0001

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