The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Morality
Abstract
Moral psychology is a rapidly growing field with two principle lineages. The main line began with Jean Piaget and includes developmental psychologists who have studied the acquisition of moral concepts and reasoning. The alternative line began in the 1990s with a new synthesis of evolutionary, neurological, and social-psychological research in which the central phenomena are moral emotions and intuitions. In this essay, I show how both of these lines have been shaped by an older debate between two 19th century narratives about modernity: one celebrating the liberation of individuals, the other mourning the loss of community and moral authority. I suggest that both lines of moral psychology have limited themselves to the moral domain prescribed by the liberation narrative, and so one future step for moral psychology should be to study alternative moral perspectives, particularly religious and politically conservative ones in which morality is, in part, about protecting groups, institutions, and souls.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundMoral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities
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Cited by
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0021847 · Cited by 2,666
Self-citationBeyond beliefs: Religions bind individuals into moral communities
Graham, J., & Haidt, J. (2010) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868309353415 · Cited by 842
Self-citationMalle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
Above and Below Left–Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations
Haidt, J., Graham, J., & Joseph, C. (2009) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/10478400903028573 · Cited by 499
Self-citationA functional approach to understanding and treating military-related moral injury
Farnsworth, J. K., Drescher, K. D., Evans, W., & Walser, R. D. (2017) · Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science · doi:10.1016/j.jcbs.2017.07.003 · Cited by 226
Metadata
- Authors
- Haidt, J.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2008-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 65-72
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W4248863879
- Cited by
- 532
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 7.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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