Questions without Words
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter describes speeded movement tasks that are formally equivalent to decision making under risk. In these tasks, subjects attempt to touch reward regions on a touch screen and avoid nearby penalty regions, much as a golfer aims to reach the green while avoiding nearby sand traps. The subject is required to complete the movement within a short time and, like the golfer, cannot completely control the outcome of the planned action. The chapter conjectures that the key difference between the tasks and ordinary decision making under risk is the source of uncertainty, implicit or explicit. In the movement tasks, the probability of each possible outcome is implicit in the subject's own motor uncertainty. In classical decision making, probabilities of outcomes are chosen by the experimenter and explicitly communicated to the subject. An experimental study shows that subjects' optimal performance is disrupted when they are confronted with explicit uncertainty about rewards and penalties.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504 · cited 4×
“Our results are consistent with the findings of Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004; see also Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004): decision makers have difficulty reasoning with explicitly stated probabilities.”
ResultInfluentialInformation capacity of discrete motor responses.
Fitts, P. M., & Peterson, J. R. (1964) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0045689 · Cited by 1,534
Optimality in human motor performance: Ideal control of rapid aimed movements.
Meyer, D. E., Abrams, R. A., Kornblum, S., Wright, C. E., & Keith Smith, J. E. (1988) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.95.3.340 · Cited by 1,406
The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test
Thaler, R. H., Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., & Schwartz, A. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555226 · Cited by 1,051
Psychological probability as a function of experienced frequency.
Attneave, F. (1953) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0057955 · Cited by 197 · cited 4×
“These failures include a tendency to frame outcomes in terms of losses and gains with an aversion to losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and to exaggerate small probabilities (Allais, 1953; Attneave, 1953; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman & Coombs, 1978; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) as illustrated by the two example…”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
Bayesian decision theory in sensorimotor control
Körding, K. P., & Wolpert, D. M. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.003 · Cited by 867
Vul (2014) · doi:10.1111/cogs.12101 · Cited by 502
Gray, W. D., Sims, C. R., Fu, W.-T., & Schoelles, M. J. (2006) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.113.3.461 · Cited by 360
Motor control is decision-making
Wolpert, D. M., & Landy, M. S. (2012) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2012.05.003 · Cited by 336
Self-citationBayesian Brains without Probabilities
Sanborn, A. N., & Chater, N. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.10.003 · Cited by 307
Metadata
- Authors
- Maloney, L. T., Trommershäuser, J., & Landy, M. S.
- Venue
- Integrated Models of Cognitive Systems
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2007-05-03
- Pages
- 297-313
- OpenAlex
- W2169239674
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 14.48
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Questions without Words. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189193.003.0021
- The paper
- Maloney, L. T., Trommershäuser, J., & Landy, M. S. (2007). Questions without Words. Integrated Models of Cognitive Systems. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780195189193.003.0021
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.