The DOI matches its Crossref record; 97 of the 97 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory
Abstract
Applying rational-choice theory to international law and international relations, this book offers a comprehensive theory of the subject, how it operates, and why it works. Taking as a starting point that states comply only when it is in their self‐interest to do so, the book demonstrates that international law nevertheless supports cooperation among states. This book develops a theory of international law to explain how concerns about reciprocal non‐compliance, retaliation, and reputation discourage states from violating their international legal commitments. By building a theory from the ground up, this book is able to address international law in all its forms, including treaties, customary international law, and “soft law.” It explains that contrary to conventional views on the subject, there is no stark difference between these different types of international law. Rather, each represents a position on a spectrum of commitment and is distinguished by the strength of the obligation it imposes. Once the various legal forms are recognized as different in degree rather than kind, other features of the system are easier to understand. The book discusses how the substantive content of an international agreement relates to its form, including whether the agreement provides for dispute resolution, monitoring, exit, escape, and reservations. With respect to customary international law, this book explains how and why such rules of law work, and how existing notions of custom must be adapted to accommodate the rational choice approach.
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Cites
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Theory of International Politics
Frankel, J., & Waltz, K. N. (1980) · International Journal · doi:10.2307/40201892 · Cited by 8,506
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550789 · Cited by 8,292
Gamst, F. C. (1991) · Anthropology of Work Review · doi:10.1525/awr.1991.12.3.19 · Cited by 7,932
Social Theory of International Politics
Wendt, A. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612183 · Cited by 7,664
Politics among nations;: The struggle for power and peace
Morgenthau, H. J. (1972) · Cited by 3,377
Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics
Moravcsik, A. (1997) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081897550447 · Cited by 2,814
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance
Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2000) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081800551280 · Cited by 2,812
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Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity
Finnemore, M., & Hollis, D. B. (2016) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.1017/s0002930000016894 · Cited by 395
Guzman, A. T., & Meyer, T. L. (2010) · Journal of Legal Analysis · doi:10.1093/jla/2.1.171 · Cited by 339
Self-citationReputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
Treaty Compliance and Violation
Simmons, B. (2010) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.132713 · Cited by 291
International law, military effectiveness, and public support for drone strikes
Kreps, S. E., & Wallace, G. P. R. (2016) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343316657405 · Cited by 128
Metadata
- Authors
- Guzman, A.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2008-01-01
- OpenAlex
- W2477486813
- Cited by
- 510
- References
- 97
- FWCI
- 29.35
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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