In Defence of Objective Bayesianism
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Abstract
Abstract Bayesian epistemology aims to answer the following question: How strongly should an agent believe the various propositions expressible in her language? Subjective Bayesians hold that.it is largely (though not entirely) up to the agent as to which degrees of belief to adopt. Objective Bayesians, on the other hand, maintain that appropriate degrees of belief are largely (though not entirely) determined by the agent's evidence. This book states and defends a version of objective Bayesian epistemology. According to this version, objective Bayesianism is characterized by three norms: (i) Probability: degrees of belief should be probabilities; (ii) Calibration: they should be calibrated with evidence; and (iii) Equivocation: they should otherwise equivocate between basic outcomes. Objective Bayesianism has been challenged on a number of different fronts: for example, it has been accused of being poorly motivated, of failing to handle qualitative evidence, of yielding counter‐intuitive degrees of belief after updating, of suffering from a failure to learn from experience, of being computationally intractable, of being susceptible to paradox, of being language dependent, and of not being objective enough. The book argues that these criticisms can be met and that objective Bayesianism is a promising theory with an exciting agenda for further research.
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Citations
Cited by
Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars
Mayo, D. G. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781107286184 · Cited by 376
An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism
Sylvan, K. L. (2020) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-7890455 · Cited by 164
“…view, the three relations correspond to three different notions of probability: personal, evidencerelative, and objective in some sense relevant to epistemology (for example, Keynes (1921)’s sense or the sense in play in some contemporary objective Bayesian views (for example, Williamson (2010)’s).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Williamson, J.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2010-04-29
- OpenAlex
- W596488402
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 32.57
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Williamson, J. (2010). In Defence of Objective Bayesianism. Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199228003.001.0001
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